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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
Research Question and Thesis Argument 
 Sectarianism has become almost synonymous with certain Middle Eastern countries. 
Since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Sunni and Shia relations have 
deteriorated, resulting in massive bloodshed and ‘cleansing.’1 Like their Arab neighbors, Syria 
began with peaceful protests in a hopeful Arab Spring. But the once hopeful spring soon turned 
into a dark winter and Syria fell into one of the worst civil wars in modern history, displacing six 
million people internally and resulting in more than two million refugees. Events which would 
have been inconceivable at the start of the millennium are now central to political discussion. 
How have we gotten to this point?  
This thesis applies a social Constructivist lens to the outbreak of sectarian conflicts in 
Iraq and Syria, the two countries in the Middle East which have seen an outbreak of violent civil 
wars in the past decade. The dominant explanations for these conflicts reduce the issue down to 
identities. This isn’t surprising given the diversity of the two states’ populations. What we aim to 
assess in this thesis is how these sectarian identities have been shaped and constructed. I refute 
the notion that sectarianism is a natural outcome of competing identities and religious myth-
symbols. Instead, I explore the question of how intermestics, or what Bahgat Korany defines as 
“the organic relationship between the international and the domestic,” shaped the sectarian 
conflicts that broke out in Syria and Iraq.
2
 The outcome of this research, which will be touched 
on in its conclusion, will put forth the common elements which have shaped the Iraqi and Syrian 
                                                          
1 Daniel Byman, “Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East,” Survival 56:1 (2014), 2. 
2 Bahgat Korany, “Redefining Development for a New Generation: A Political Economy Analysis,” in Arab 
Human Development in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Bahgat Korany (Cairo: American University in Cairo 
Press, 2014), 5. 
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sectarian conflicts. Such analyses can be used to better understand the potential dangers of future 
sectarian strife in the region. Furthermore, the argument of this thesis highlights the importance 
of looking at the complex dynamics of intermestics in international relations. 
Two basic concepts dominate the study of these case studies in political science, the 
primordialist and modernist arguments.
3
 The primordialist views the conflicts in Iraq and Syria 
as a result of ancient conflicts and competing ethno-symbolism. In this perspective, sectarian 
conflicts were inevitable due to the intrinsic differences among the populations in Iraq and 
Syria.
4
 The modernist argues that political identities are imagined and manipulated by the ruling 
elites. I find neither argument sufficient in explaining the very complex relationships within Iraq 
and Syria. This thesis will argue that the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have been constructed by the 
international and domestic communities. Powerful ideas and interests domestically and 
internationally have brought forth policies and acts which allowed for the burgeoning of 
sectarian identities and conflicts, ones reacting to the dynamics of intermestics.   
Due to the complex nature of the topic at hand, specific boundaries need to be made to 
maintain clarity and structure. As the research questions relate to how sectarian conflicts are 
constructed, my thesis will only assess the situations up until the first outbreak of what most 
consider “civil war,” commonly agreed to mean 1000 combat deaths a year combined from each 
side.
5
 In Iraq, our assessment will end in 2006 when sectarian violence ignited. In Syria, this 
means an analysis of the situation up until its civil war began sometime in 2011. The thesis will 
also draw upon references back to the mandate period. This is due to the fact that many political 
                                                          
3 Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly 36:2 (2015), 354-358. 
4 Ibid., 356. 
5 Ibid., 358. 
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scientists claim that the divisions of the Ottoman Empire into various mandates imagined by the 
international community played an instrumental role in shaping the very structure of these 
societies and ensured the inevitability of sectarianism in the region.
6
  
Furthermore, this research will be limited to the study of religious sectarianism. This 
allows for a more focused analysis, in part due to the predominantly religious tones of the 
conflicting sects. Sectarianism as a whole is understood as “a contextualized and historicized 
understanding of the concept, rather than an essentialized one, with an emphasis on sectarianism 
as being produced – and reproduced – by forces of both a structural and an agential nature; it 
utilizes an inclusive understanding of the elements that compromise sectarian dynamics – 
accepting communal/religious variables as a starting point (rather than an end point) of analysis 
yet recognizing that factionalism that typifies sectarian polities is generated by the complex 
interaction of a variety of factional dynamics.”7 In essence, sectarianism is understood as salient 
communal identities that create tensions between different communal groups. Since this thesis 
focuses only on religious sectarianism, I will not study the issue of ethnic minorities and groups, 
including the prominent Kurdish movement in the two states and the region. The Kurdish 
question in particular requires its own extensive analysis, which is both beyond the scope of this 
paper and has already been done extensively by various scholars. Any analysis of Kurds and 
other ethnic groups will be in the context of understanding religious sectarianism as a whole. 
This thesis will be organized into four chapters that focus on a specific component of the 
argument. In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the research puzzle, explain the 
theoretical framework and methodological issues and then situate this research within the overall 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 357. 
7 Paul Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Postwar 
Lebanon, (New York: Suny Press, 2013). 
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literature on sectarianism. Chapter two will delve into the thesis’s first case study on Iraq. The 
influence of the British mandate and its underlying Orientalist preconceptions will lay the 
foundation for understanding the modern Iraqi state. I will then dive into an assessment of 
intermestics during Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and end with a similar analysis of the 
period of the American invasion of Iraq.  Chapter three will focus on the Syrian case by similarly 
assessing the impact of the French mandate, followed by an assessment of how intermestics 
shaped sectarianism during the regimes of Hafiz al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad. Chapter two and 
three focus on key events and discourse in order to analyze the intermestic impact and how it 
contributed to fueling – or quelling – sectarianism. Chapter four will conclude by highlighting 
key patterns of sectarian construction from both case studies by assessing common structural and 
agent-level mechanisms that fueled sectarianism in the two states. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodological Issues  
This thesis derives its theoretical inspiration from social Constructivism. The emphasis of 
social Constructivism on identities, intersubjectivity, the power of ideas and the malleable nature 
of interests allow for a more critical analysis of the creation of sectarianism in our case studies. 
According to the Constructivist corpus, all aspects of international relations are constructed by 
actors and are subject to change. As was written by one of the founders of Constructivist thought, 
Alexander Wendt: 
Social structures include material resources like gold and tanks. In contrast to neorealists 
desocialized view of such capabilities, Constructivists argue that material resources only 
acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which 
they are embedded. For example, 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the 
United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the 
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United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared 
understandings.
8
  
This last statement is the basic inspiration of this thesis, “amity or enmity is a function of 
shared understandings.” In other words, we cannot neglect the importance of social norms and 
ideas in shaping politics. We must assess actions and reactions as linked to ideas and interests of 
actors to better understand the political scene. Accordingly, we must analyze the way in which 
state interactions and the international system as a whole constructed the sectarian identities 
within Syria and Iraq. 
But one cannot simply claim to be “Constructivist” and not delve further into the meaning 
of this term within her or his analysis. The Constructivist corpus is massive, with as much variety 
as any other international relations theory. The basics agreed upon by different Constructivists 
include the focus on ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in politics, specifically 
emphasizing the “intersubjective” nature of ideas.9 There is also a general focus on the 
constitutive nature of agents and structures. The earliest Constructivists originally focused on 
simply showing that norms, rules and social structures of meaning actually matter in the world of 
politics. Katzenstein’s work in The Culture of National Security tackled this basic issue by 
analyzing things like weapons taboos, military culture and identity politics and how social 
structures more generally construct interests and behaviors that materialize and shape 
international relations.
10
  
                                                          
8 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20: 1 (1995), 71-81. 
9 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001), 393. 
10 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
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With the growth and increased legitimacy of Constructivism, however, different varieties 
of Constructivists with competing research agendas burgeoned in the field of IR. I now attempt 
to place myself within this massive field of differences within the Constructivist school. One of 
the larger debates of the paradigm lies in its assumptions. Modern and postmodern variants of 
Constructivism, as named by Price & Reus-Smit, split Constructivist thinkers. According to 
Martha Finnemore and Kathyrn Sikkink, the difference can be understood by the following: 
Postmodernist Constructivists reject efforts to find a point from which to assess the 
validity of analytical and ethical knowledge claims. This stance makes it possible to 
deconstruct and critique the knowledge claims of others but makes it difficult to construct 
and evaluate new knowledge claims. For modern Constructivists, on the other hand, 
acceptance that the world is always interpreted does not imply that all interpretations or 
explanations are equal; some types of explanation and evidence are more persuasive or 
logically and empirically plausible than others.
11
 
  
Between these two areas, this thesis is situated in the modern approach; more specifically 
it is aligned with one of the founders of Constructivism, Alexander Wendt. Wendt and 
Katzenstein helped pioneer the field of identity research within Constructivism.
12
 The weight of 
international issues, however, is different for the two authors. Finnemore and Sikkink’s analysis 
of Katzenstein and Wendt lead them to claim that while Katzenstein focuses primarily on the 
importance of domestic influence on identity formation, Wendt emphasizes the international and 
systemic impact. While Wendt does emphasize the importance of systemic factors, my own 
reading of Wendt has interpreted greater balance within his theoretical framework in terms of the 
weight of the agent as opposed to the social structure.  
A Wendt-Inspired Constructivist Approach 
                                                          
11 Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program,” 394. 
12 Ibid., 399. 
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The following will aim to briefly highlight the important aspects of Wendt’s theory that 
will be applied in this thesis. It should be noted that I do not aim to put forth a comprehensive 
description or analysis of his theory, as that is beyond the scope of this text. Instead, I aim to 
highlight the most essential terms and components of his theory which will be most relevant in 
the analysis put forth in this thesis. Following Wendt’s own chronology in his classic book 
Social Theory of International Politics will also give us more structure in the process. 
First, Wendt places an emphasis on the state system project, which he supports by 
elaborating on the central role played by the state. Despite the important role of other actors, he 
posits that states “are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the 
regulation of violence are channeled into the world system.”13  He elaborates that non-state 
actors may be “becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change 
ultimately happens through states.” States are thus the central actor in the system, according to 
Wendt.  
This thesis has a similar bias, focusing predominantly on states and state-actors instead of 
other units. Other actors, like intergovernmental organizations for example, are mentioned within 
the analysis. However, I use such intergovernmental organizations, like the League of Nations, to 
better understand the international system as a whole, instead of assessing them as actors within 
the international arena.  
Wendt also differentiates between ideational and materialist theories and rightly places 
Constructivism within the ideational realm. In this way, Constructivism’s overall project 
revolves around the structure of social consciousness or ideas.
14
 He emphasizes that “It does not 
                                                          
13 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999: 7. 
14 Ibid., 24-25. 
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mean that power and interest are unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend 
on actors’ ideas.” This point is central to the argument and analysis of this thesis, since 
sectarianism is an idea, though it does have material foundations and outcomes, as will be seen 
later in the paper.    
The holistic dimension of Constructivism is also elaborated upon. What does a holistic 
approach entail? Unlike one-dimensional approaches, holistic theories do not focus mainly on 
individual agents and interactions. One must delve into a deeper analysis which is not simply 
causal and focused on behavioral effects only. One must look at the property effects. For 
example, a Constructivist analysis can assess how interactions actually impact the system or 
actors’ identity, not only behavioral changes.15 Wendt’s moderate approach is once again 
highlighted when he takes both behavioral and property effects into consideration. Wendt 
stresses that “the structure of the international system exerts both kinds of effects on state 
identities. These may be less than the effects of domestic structures, and certainly a complete 
theory of state identity would have a substantial domestic component.”   
Wendt continues throughout his book to elaborate on the importance of such unit-level 
interaction analysis, that of interactions between states which have behavioral effects. The unit-
level analysis is needed prior to delving deeper into the property effects of the full structure. To 
elaborate further on these important concepts, he states: “The one [causal] describes a change in 
the state of Y as a result of a change in the state of an independently existing X. The other 
[constitutive] describes how the properties of an X make a Y what it is… The causal and 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 26-27. 
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constitutive effects of culture on agents can be exerted on just their behavior, on their properties 
(identities and interests), or on both.”16 
In terms of the structure-agent debate, Wendt makes it clear that both are central to 
Constructivism. “It is important that IR do both [agent and system] kinds of theorizing.”17 It is 
not enough for Wendt to focus on one or the other. Purely looking at interactions of agents – i.e. 
states – would be reductionist. Unit interaction-level analysis is considered micro-structural and 
the systemic approach is defined as macro-structural.
18
 Both types of analysis are important to 
Wendt. My analysis will be biased towards micro-level interactions in earlier chapters but will 
aim to delve deeper into a macro-structural analysis in the concluding chapters. Another 
important highlight of Wendt’s theory lies in his definition of the social system: 
The structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, 
interests, and ideas… [They are] distinct and play different roles in explanation. The 
significance of material conditions is constituted in part by interest, but they are not the 
same thing…. Similarly, interests are constituted in part by ideas, but they are not the 
same thing… without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no 
meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all…. 
The task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system 
fit together into some kind of whole.”19 
 
 Herein is the basis of this thesis. I expand most on the ideological component of the state 
identities of Iraq and Syria and how domestic, international, micro and macro structures have 
constituted the current state of affairs. To do this, Wendt’s three elements are assessed – material 
conditions, interests and at the heart of all of these, ideas. As Wendt so accurately points out, 
“people act toward objects, including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 165. 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Ibid., 150. 
19 Ibid., 139. 
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for them.”20 Wendt narrows down this notion of “ideas” to knowledge – or a belief that is taken 
to be true by actors. Even this concept of knowledge is complex. Knowledge is a set of 
“interlocking beliefs” which is subjective and intersubjective at the same time. The system in 
which these beliefs exist automatically has a constitutive effect.  
To clarify the above, Wendt gives the poignant example of two identical states that 
believe themselves to be the “hegemon,” thus identifying themselves as stabilizing forces in the 
system. In the scenario in which the dominant state is legitimate within the system, it is 
empowered by others and thus can act on its self-identity. It is also constituted as the “stabilizer” 
and the “hegemon” by itself and the system. In the other case, the dominant state isn’t 
empowered by others, thus other states will negatively perceive actions to balance the system, 
which will impact actions and reactions. In that scenario, the state is not actually a hegemon as 
this identity is limited to its own beliefs. In Wendt’s own words, contrary to the Finnemore and 
Sikkink analysis, his approach to culture gives “equal weight to agency and structure.”21 
In addition to Wendt’s theoretical framework, this thesis is also partially inspired by the 
theoretical work of Iver Neumann in “Self and Other in International Relations,” which explored 
the role of identity in shaping international relations.
22
 Neumann claims that, contrary to popular 
belief, eliminating the “Other” is not the purpose of politics. Instead, Neumann claims that the 
purpose of politics is creating and maintaining this other. This basic idea about the “other” and 
the “self” will appear often throughout the paper.  
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid., 184. 
22 Iver Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 
2:2 (1996): 139-174. 
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Through Constructivism and its elements, which have been elaborated upon, one cannot 
take sectarianism for granted. To claim that it was inevitable for sectarianism to erupt due to 
competing interests of religious groups, for example, would be reductionist. One must look 
further and assess how interests and identities were and are continually constituted. 
Applying Intermestics and Other Methodological Issues 
The works mentioned above focus on the construction of international relations – or 
relations between two or more states. This thesis expands on their work by bringing in 
intermestics to operationalize this critical social Constructivist lens. According to Bahgat 
Korany, intermestics is defined as the following: 
It is a reflection of creeping globalization, characterized by the retreat of exclusive state 
sovereignty, and the rise instead of the intensity of societal interconnectedness and 
speedy circulation of ideas, but without wiping out the impact of local features.
23
 
Our aim is to understand how sectarianism within Iraq and Syria respectfully has been 
impacted by the organic connectedness of local and global influences, as the identities within the 
nations have been shaped by both factors. To ignore one or the other would, once again, lead to 
reductionism. Given Wendt’s emphasis on the importance of domestic factors and the clear focus 
of intermestics on both domestic and international variables, I expand on Wendt’s understanding 
of micro-structural level analysis by adding domestic factors in this area. While Wendt uses this 
term to define interaction-level analysis between states, we will view micro-level analysis as 
both between states and within one state (domestic). Macro-structural analysis will sustain its 
purely international systemic approach. 
                                                          
23  Bahgat Korany, “The Middle East Since the Cold War,” in International Relations of the Middle East, 
ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 81. 
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Through a historical analysis which relies on both secondary and primary data, this thesis 
will explore the construction of identities, ideas and structures in Iraq and Syria which led to 
sectarian conflict. Materials used include secondary research from books and journals along with 
an exploration of memoires, interviews, state records, speeches, statements, news articles and 
survey data. Using this information, I will expand on the application of a Wendt-inspired 
Constructivism to the realm of intermestics, allowing for a more complete understanding of how 
sectarianism was constructed in Iraq and Syria.   
The historical perspective of this thesis is worth a brief discussion. In International 
Relations, political scientists have predominantly focused on the current political moment with a 
hint of forward-looking analysis, to varying degrees of success. This thesis looks back on a 
period of approximately one-hundred years of intermestic occurrences and applies a 
Constructivist IR analysis. Why did I choose to have a longer historic perspective? In order to 
understand the states of Iraq and Syria and an issue as complex as sectarianism, one is obliged to 
look at a longer period of time, especially given that those who espouse sectarian sentiments 
contextualize themselves within a historic sense of victimhood.
24
 Furthermore, early sectarian 
policies have materialized changes in the position of power of certain groups over others, as will 
be seen with the impact of the French mandate on Alawi domination in Syria.
25
 We must assess 
different sectarian moments to see how intermestics have played into the construction of such 
sectarian identities. Given the real impact of history in shaping such identities, the only way to 
understand the issue is by going back in time to the original construction of the state itself and 
the politics that have influenced identity formation.    
                                                          
24 John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, Jose Ramon Sanchez and Caroleen Marji Sayej, The Iraq Papers. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 313-314. 
25 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 26-27. 
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Situating the Thesis within the Research  
 The literature in political science analyzing sectarianism is split between two camps. One 
perspective emphasizes the intrinsic conflicts between different groups derived from competing 
symbols and ancient conflicts. This is known as the primordialist argument.
26
 On the other side is 
the modernist perspective, which focuses on imagined political identities which are then 
manipulated by the ruling elite.
27
  
 The primordialist argument is quite simple to understand and that is perhaps why it has 
been the dominant explanation used by the general public and media. A look at the Sykes-Picot 
agreement could indicate that the issue lies with the way mandates were segmented, without 
taking into consideration the various ethnicities within. In this perspective, the story is simple. In 
the twentieth century, just before the end of World War I, the British and French divided the 
Ottoman Empire into French and British mandates.
28
 The agreement, with its simple straight 
lines dividing the region, made no real effort to understand the tribal and religious diversity 
within the newly created mandates. As a result of this agreement, Syria, at the time of the 
outbreak of civil war in 2011, became a state with the following diverse population: 64 % Sunni 
Arabs, 9% Christians, 3% Druze, 1% Shia, 10% Kurds and Alawis.
29
 In Iraq, according to Pew 
Research in 2011, 51 percent of the population identifies themselves as Shia Muslims and 42 % 
                                                          
26 Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” 357. 
27 Ibid., 358. 
28 Tarek Osman, “Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WWI still rock the Middle East,” BBC News, 
December 14, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553. 
29 Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” 350-358. 
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identifies as Sunni.
30
 This primordialist perspective thus claims that due to ancient hatred and 
competing ideologies, it was inevitable for sectarianism to run amok in 2011 Syria during the 
Arab Spring and in 2006 Iraq without the control of Saddam Hussein. This is a popular belief, 
one that even some world leaders hold to. According to U.S. President Barack Obama in a 2013 
statement on Syria, “In that part of the world, there are ancient sectarian differences.”31  
 Fanar Haddad makes a more sophisticated argument for the primordialist perspective.
32
 
Haddad claims that modern political identities in Iraq are based on ancient ethnic ties bound to 
certain myth-symbols. Those myth-symbols are dormant and ready to be reawakened in future 
crisis. This is a bottom-up perspective, unlike the modernist views as will be seen shortly. 
In line with this perspective, Naser Ghobadzdeh and Shahram Akbarzadeh argue that 
“other”ing is intrinsic to Islamic thought. According to the authors, Islam uses “other”ing to 
justify itself, presenting a binary world of “core true believers” surrounded by disbelief.33 This 
othering has thus evoked sectarian beliefs that ignited into violence against Shias in the Muslim 
world. Similarly, the authors claim that Shia Muslims also use “othering” against Sunnis, as 
exemplified by revolutionary Iran which depicted the Sunni governments as tyrannical and 
illegitimate. 
For the Islamists this is a battle between good and evil – a Manichean perspective which 
opens the door to the evocation of the concept of jihad to defeat evil. Holy war is the 
jihadists’ answer to the above challenge, which presents the good vs evil (Islam vs Kufr) 
duel as a matter of existential urgency. While not all Islamists are jihadists, jihadism 
                                                          
30 Michael Lipka, “The Sunni-Shia divide: Where they live, what they believe and how they view each 
other,” Pew Research Center, June 18, 2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-
sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other. 
31 Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Syria,” The White House, August 31, 2013. 
32 Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
33 Naser Ghobadzdeh and Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Sectarianism and the prevalence of ‘other’ in Islamic 
Thought,” Third World Quarterly 36:4 (2015), 691. 
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draws on the Islamist world-view and is sustained by practices and traditions of othering 
in Islamic scholarship.
34
   
 While the authors of the above focus on the construction of “other”ing, there is an 
assumption that this is an intrinsic part of Islam, and thus the argument becomes a mix of 
primordialist and Constructivist. The authors claim that the construction of the “other” is a 
natural part of Islam, its history and its myth symbols. This assumption leads to the logical 
conclusion that there can be no reconciliation among different religious groups in Muslim-
dominant countries. 
 On the other side of the spectrum are modernists who claim that political identities are 
imagined and manipulated by ruling elites. Different scholars have focused on varying aspects of 
the creation of sectarianism. Research agendas in the past have usually focused on politics from 
above and have been able to come up with a variety of intriguing studies. 
According to Christopher Phillips, for example, Syria has been the subject of 
manipulation by the Ottomans and French as well as Syrian politicians in the 50s and 60s and the 
Assads after them.
35
 Phillips argues that sectarian propaganda was also used by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, through the use of anti-Alawi writings of Ibn Taymieh. In the Bashar al-Assad era, 
Alawi elites were favored and Sunnis marginalized in the interest of the ruling elites. Such 
modernists thus view sectarianism from the top-down, whereby ruling elites have the control, 
unlike the primordialists.  
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Another author, Benjamin White focused most of his energies on the analysis of the 
Syrian mandate period.
36
 White’s research is an intriguing Constructivist analysis of the concepts 
of majority and minority in Syria. He does not focus on sectarianism explicitly but is instead 
interested in the constitution of identities within this dichotomy of minority and majority and 
how the mandate period brought these terms into popular coinage among both elites and the 
general population. 
There is a plethora of other writings currently available for those interested in researching 
sectarianism in Iraq and Syria. Many research projects have delved into the impact of the 
mandate periods on Syria and Iraq. Others have focused on a single issue like White’s research 
into the construction of minorities. Phillips, for example, focused on to what degree the conflict 
in Syria can be characterized as sectarian. It is agreed in most of the literature that there is an 
element of religious sectarianism to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. This thesis is not interested in 
proving this point specifically, but instead will look at the elements of sectarianism historically 
in both cases in order to analyze how sectarianism has been constructed.  
This thesis aims to create an analysis that is as unbiased as possible towards either only 
top-down or bottom-up perspectives. The primordialist approach is viewed as bottom-up while 
the modernist approach focuses on the top-down. Such analyses deny the dynamism of politics 
and bind actors, interests and ideas to a single vertical motion. The use of diaries, journals and 
eyewitness reports through the Constructivist perspective will allow for a more dynamic analysis 
than either the traditional primordialist or modernist perspective can attain since it is not bound 
by these limited views. Actors, interests and ideas are seen as dynamic and bound to act and 
react to each other and thus are not bound to any single vertical motion.   
                                                          
36 Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in 
French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2011), 40-45. 
19 
 
This thesis thus aims to do two things. First, it aims to bring forth a Constructivist 
analysis of information available on Iraq and Syria. It will assess secondary sources through the 
prism of Wendt’s Constructivist approach, and it will count on primary sources, including 
speeches, diaries, journals, eyewitness reports, literature and newspaper articles which include 
first-hand accounts of events. This thesis is unique in its historic perspective on both cases and 
its approach in analyzing sectarianism in Iraq and Syria in order to form both a case-study 
Constructivist analysis of each state’s sectarian character and also assess the common agent and 
structure elements in both. Through an assessment explicitly using Wendt’s approach, this thesis 
will bring forth additional insights about the construction of sectarianism in Iraq and Syria. 
It is important to have both a case-study component as well as a synthesis of the two 
cases. The case studies will allow for a deeper assessment of the particular elements of each 
state. Ignoring the individual components would lead to too much generalization that could be 
misunderstood. Still, identifying the key similar patterns of the cases will allow us to identify 
some of the more generalizable points in the construction of sectarianism that could potentially 
be used for future research.  
Chapter 2 – Constructing Sectarianism in Iraq  
Introduction 
The Shia-Sunni divide in Iraq is one that has been constantly conveyed in media and in 
research. The first question one must ask is, are sectarian identities salient? The second question 
is: if they are prominent among the population, are they expressed in opposition to one another in 
a way that would lead to sectarian violence? According to Pew Research in 2011, 14 percent of 
Iraqi Sunnis said that they do not consider Shias to be Muslim; in contrast, only 1 percent of 
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Iraqi Shias made the same claim that their Sunni countrymen are not Muslim.
37
 While these may 
seem like small percentages, one can interpret this viewpoint as the more radical perspective, as 
it completely ostracizes the other group as outside of the Muslim tradition, which, as will be 
seen, is central to Iraqi identity. It is also significant in that it shows greater animosity on the side 
of the Sunnis than the Shias, which will be understood through the analysis in this chapter.  
Another Pew Research finding is able to paint a more complete picture. In a survey of 
thirty-nine predominantly Muslim countries in 2011 and 2012, research noted that a significant 
share of Muslims globally don’t see a distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam and thus view 
themselves in a non-sectarian manner by affiliating as “just a Muslim.” On the other hand, in 
Iraq only 5 percent answered “just a Muslim” and more than ninety-percent of respondents 
categorized themselves in one of the affiliated groups.
38
 This is significant because it shows a 
salient sense of affiliation with a particular sect of Islam. However, these numbers alone cannot 
portray the complex identity conflicts at play in Iraq. One must delve deeper. 
 The twentieth and twenty-first centuries in Iraq are intriguing for the study of 
Constructivism and intermestics for a variety of reasons. The country’s history is deeply complex 
with the intermingling of international and domestic influences, both of which have resulted in 
concrete effects that can be seen throughout its history. Other cases may give way to interesting 
analyses based on international diplomatic ties or international pressures, but Iraq has seen its 
fair share of direct international interventions, whether during its early years as a nascent state 
under the British mandate or its recent experience as an occupied territory under the United 
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States of America. And, of course, it has experienced the ramifications of changes in neighboring 
countries and the globe. This history has entrenched intermestics in the country, with both 
domestic and international influences shaping Iraq’s identity and the internal relations of its 
peoples.  
 Before delving into our analysis, we first briefly revisit some of the main principles of 
Constructivism. Wendt can shed light on some of the main principles that will be used to assess 
intermestics in our case. According to Wendt, “Identities and such collective cognitions do not 
exist apart from each other; they are ‘mutually constitutive.’”39 He also goes on to claim, “It is 
through reciprocal interaction… that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social 
structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests.” These interactions are thus 
integral to our analyses. We will assess the interactions between states and within them to see 
how sectarian religious identities have become such an integral part of the Iraqi narrative and 
identity, sectarian identities which continue to plague the nation during its current civil war. We 
begin by assessing the period of the British mandate in Iraq, followed by an analysis of the 
Baathist regime and ending with the impact of the American invasion in Iraq. 
 
The British Mandate: Orientalist Thought & the Early Construction of Iraqi Identity 
 Many have claimed that Iraq’s current chaotic state is a simple result of the fact that the 
nature of the “state” and Iraq’s borders were created through a Western lens. One can take a look 
at the Sykes-Picot agreement and interpret that the issue lies with the way mandates were 
segmented, without taking into consideration the various ethnicities within the boundaries. Just 
before the end of the First World War, the British and French segmented the Ottoman Empire 
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and took control of territories under their respective mandates.
40
 The agreement’s overly 
simplistic straight lines dividing the region gave no heed or consideration for the tribal and 
religious diversity within the newly created mandates. Referencing back to the Pew Research of 
2011, 51 percent of the Iraqi population identifies as Shia Muslims and 42 % identify as Sunni, 
in addition to a number of other minorities such as the Kurds and Assyrians.
41
 
It is not sufficient to chalk up sectarianism to diversity, as there are countless success 
stories for quite diverse states. As Wendt notes, “it is through reciprocal interaction” that social 
constructs are created and reinforced.
42
 What reciprocal interactions have shaped Iraqi 
sectarianism? We first turn to the powerful British ideas about Iraqi society in the early twentieth 
century and how these notions led to concrete constructs in terms of social institutions and 
actions which irreversibly impacted the population.  
 The League of Nations handed Great Britain the mandate of Iraq after World War I in 
1920, with at least the superficial appearance that the ‘mandate’ was a step away from the former 
model of European domination in the form of colonial conquest.
43
 Britain’s inherited ideas about 
Iraqi society influenced the policies enacted in the nascent state; policies which helped define 
Iraq’s early identity. 
 Britain’s acting commissioners throughout the beginning of the early twentieth century 
give insight into British perception of Iraqi society. As Acting Civil Commissioner in Iraq from 
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1918 to 1920, A.T. Wilson put no trust in the Iraqi people to rule their own country.
44
 Under his 
time as commissioner, he largely ignored Iraqi sentiment in the new state. According to Wilson, 
Great Britain must not be “diverted by a handful of amateur politicians in Baghdad.” After tribal 
uprisings overcame the mandate in 1920, Percy Cox replaced Wilson and took the mantle of 
High Commissioner in Iraq.  
Orientalist Ideas Re-Constitute Identities around Tribe & Religious Divisions 
British commissioners came to power with preconceived notions of the former Ottoman 
Empire and the Orient in general. Toby Dodge describes the Orientalist lens through which 
British personnel viewed the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Their understanding of Iraqi 
society was based on the “popular imaginative constructions influential in British and wider 
European society from the eighteenth century onwards.”45 This meant that these ideas played a 
key role in how the British mandate operated by influencing the types of interests Britain had 
which thus materialized into policies on the ground. With the negative stereotypes of the 
Ottoman Turks in mind, the new personnel considered the urban class educated under the 
Ottoman Empire “tainted by training and working within corrupt institutions.” This powerful 
idea about the inept Ottoman-corrupted class needed an “other” to which it could be juxtaposed. 
Rural Arab tribes, who were seen as “true” Iraqis that remained unadulterated by the vile nature 
of the Turkish enemy, filled this “other” role. As Dodge states: 
With the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War, British propaganda had 
begun to use Orientalist tropes to portray “the Turk” as degenerate, slavish and brutal. As 
the war progressed, strategic thinking and public imagination focused on the role of the 
Arab revolt and hence on the non-Turkish populations within the Ottoman Empire. This 
conscious and subconscious separation of Ottoman and Arab became more accentuated 
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with the birth of the mandate ideal in 1919 The Arab populations of the Ottoman Empire 
were now allies of the victorious powers. Free from Turkish oppression, they were 
worthy candidates for states of their own, capable of benefiting from European tutelage.
46
 
 
The discourse around the urbanites clearly shows the negative perceptions and one-
dimensional constructs created by the British due to Orientalism. Commissioner Cox called the 
urban elite “impecunious and backward,” whereas a British Political Officer in Najaf called for 
the isolation of the “half-fledged intelligence of Baghdad” who would adulterate the rest of 
society.
47
 With these notions in mind, the British turned their eyes to the tribes – or the 
romanticized version of the tribal system which the British helped bring to life. 
Such images were powerful and continued to influence British perception of Iraqis whose 
progression during the Ottoman era was completely ignored. In Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, 
written in 1925, Longrigg claims that Iraq passed through four hundred years of stagnant 
Ottoman rule.
48
As he put it, the country had experienced “almost no progress” either in “mind 
and spirit, or of material wealth and modern method.” Longrigg posits that Iraq at the turn of the 
twentieth century may be a “little less wild and ignorant, as unfitted for self-government, and not 
less corrupt.” 
 Furthermore, not only did the British project constructs of popular Ottoman Orientalist 
sentiments onto Iraq, but they also falsely projected their own society’s experience onto the Iraqi 
one. In an attempt to organize society, Britain placed a single unifying tribe above others in 
different regions.
49
 Through the new British policy, tribal leadership would pass down through 
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familial ties, from father to son or brother to brother. This was a direct reflection of the British 
monarchical system and had no foundation in the organic relations of tribes in Iraq. In fact, the 
process for the bequeathal of Iraqi tribal leadership had once been based on consensus, with 
tribes collectively selecting a leader who was deemed most qualified. Such policies and the 
allowance of privileges to certain tribes to tax and lord over others led to animosities that grew 
into the revolt of 1920. As Dodge states, “the British projected simplistic but powerful notions of 
their own historic past on to the rural population of Iraq.”50 
 The consequence of these British perceptions was a concrete construction of Iraqi 
society, which directed society towards rural divisions instead of paving a pathway for the urban 
class to build a more modern state. The British put power into the hands of the tribes, through the 
tribal sheikhs, who would be used as intermediaries between the people and the state.
51
 The 
sheikhs became the rural aristocracy and the educated urban class was completely stripped of 
power. All of these real changes arose from powerful Orientalist ideas. 
The emphasis on the tribal system can be seen through the efforts of the British to 
categorize and order society according to tribal lineage. Tribes were chronicled and details were 
put together at length in relation to the origins of each tribe, the larger group from which it came, 
and the degree of tribal “purity,” which was measured by how directly leaders were descendent 
from early tribal founders.
52
 British records from the period show long, elaborate lists detailing 
information about various tribes across Iraq. Headlines include the number of men within tribes, 
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number of rifles and number of towers controlled.
53
 The only individuals explicitly named in 
these lists were the key sheikhs from each tribe, who were heavily investigated to better 
understand their personality and lineage. The clear emphasis on these individual personalities 
and Britain’s negligence of the rest of society shows the importance placed on tribal leaders’ 
shoulders. A report on the land revenue in the region of Kirkuk in 1919 summarizes the 
centrality of the tribe in the British mandate of Iraq:  
Political freedom cannot be attained except through a community. We must therefore 
look for some simple form of responsible community on which to base our system. The 
simplest form of community in the purely Kurdish area is the tribe or the section of tribe: 
elsewhere the village.
54
 
 Often, written accounts by British personnel during the mandate make reference to the 
tribal nature of Iraqi society, with A.T. Wilson describing the “unsophisticated” Arab, Kurd, or 
Persian with their deep loyalty to family and tribe. Thus, it became policy to only consider the 
tribal sheikh when considering policy issues. As Gertrude Bell states, the “rank and file of the 
tribesmen, shepherds, marsh dwellers, rice, barley, and date cultivators of the Euphrates and 
Tigris, whose experience of statecraft was confined to speculations, as to the performances of 
their next-door neighbors” would hardly be useful in advising the nascent state.55 
 The unstable nature of this formalized tribal system, in which the sheikh soon became the 
ultimate source of power and authority over whole areas, becomes quite clear by looking at just 
one example of the failure of its authority. Ali Sulaiman, who ruled the Dulaim on the upper 
Euphrates, was seen by the British as an instrumental force of authority.
56
 In 1922, Yetts, a 
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divisional adviser, had placed his greatest hopes in Sulaiman’s ability to wield authority over the 
region: “if a place can be found in the body politic for the type which Sheikh Ali Sulaiman 
represents with their rights clearly defined the whole-hearted support of this class can be counted 
on.” But despite this enthusiastic vote of confidence, Sulaiman failed in his role and it became 
apparent that the power placed upon the sheikhs was shallower than expected. While several 
sectional leaders had recognized Sulaiman as their supreme sheikh, as the British desired, in an 
attempt to avoid British retribution for their part in the 1920 rebellion, this show of support came 
without real foundations. In 1924, Sulaiman was unable to collect revenues from the people and 
needed to call the British to help him fulfill his duty. As it turned out, perhaps the sheikh’s power 
and influence were not as strong as the British imagined.  
 Some of the points mentioned above are useful in understanding that the British did not 
base their perceptions of Iraqi society on an objective perception of reality. The British formed 
their own constructs that in many ways altered Iraqi society. Giving power to tribal leaders in 
geographically divided territory inevitably brings political power struggles in this arena. The 
salience of the tribal identity, when it is the main identifying marker used in government, would 
thus be higher in such a society. Instead of being organized by wealth, education, or other 
identifiers, the tribal root is activated as the main identifier. Not only did the British bring greater 
salience to tribal identity but they also fed into Shia-Sunni tensions. 
Empowering the Minority: Disenfranchising the Shia & Constructing the Shia “Other” 
Dodge affirms that religious divisions were a very important category for British 
personnel during the time of the Iraq mandate. According to Sir Henry Dobbs: 
The Jews and the Christians . . . are the most progressive of the inhabitants of the 
country. Although they number only about 7 percent of the population, the proportion of 
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wealth in their hands must be very much greater. They are much more interested in the 
development of the country.
57
 
 A prominent element of the Orientalist perspective that dominated British thought is thus 
the concept of the backwardness of Islam. Longrigg states that “no Islamic state in modern times 
had reached the first rank of nations.”58 The effect of Islam meant that “in the very air and aspect 
of the East there seems to lie an acquiescence, a lack of the forward impulse.” Just like with the 
tribes, the British categorized groups based on religious affiliation. While Islam as a whole was 
viewed negatively, Shia Islam seemed “more Islamic than Sunni Islam,” according to Dodge’s 
analysis.
59
 The British, weary of the Shias, gave preferential treatment to Sunnis and Sunni 
tribes. 
Just as will be seen in later years in Iraqi history, the Shia were categorized under British 
rule as “alien” – Persians who had no real or authentic connection to Iraq. The Shia ulama, 
intellectuals, or Mujtahids were looked at with suspicion under British rule. Gertrude Bell, an 
influential administrator and advisor in the creation of the British mandated Iraq, seems highly 
skeptical of them and repeatedly references Shia clerics as “alien popes,” “exercising real 
temporal authority . . . and obstructing the Government at every turn.”60 The Mujtahids were a 
hindrance to Iraq’s development due to their backward nature. The rebellion of 1920 was blamed 
fully on the Shias – and their foreign nature. British intelligence reports between 1920 and 1927 
focused on the alleged role of the Shia Mujtahids in inflaming the violent rebellion amongst the 
Shia tribes along the Euphrates. The British used these suspicions to justify consolidating power 
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and authority with Sunnis. It thus appears that the British, whether knowingly or unintentionally, 
were fueling sectarianism by dividing societal power and placing Sunnis above their Shia 
counterparts, more specifically Sunni tribes over Shia ones. 
It may be useful in this analysis to go back to some primary texts written by those who 
supported in the administration and creation of the new Iraqi state. We can take a brief look at 
the published letters of Gertrude Bell, the previously mentioned administrator and advisor in the 
creation of the British mandated Iraq. Her words are quite revealing of the attitude of the British 
– as well as, in some cases, the Iraqis – in the formation of the state. Specifically, we will assess 
her discourse on the Shia-Sunni relations and on how the British went about forming the new 
state when it came to religion.  
In her letters, Bell frequently mentioned the animosity between Sunnis and Shias, and 
points to the hostility of the Shias towards the new mandate. Bell states that “the Naqib’s 
Council has against it almost the whole body of Shias, first because it’s looked upon as of British 
parentage, but also because it contains considerably less Shias than Sunnis.”61 She then goes on 
to highlight an important aspect of British attitude, which influenced the formation of the new 
government. “The Shias, as I’ve often observed, are one of the greatest problems.” As Dodge 
noted, Shias are often mixed with Persians, with no distinction made between the two. In a letter 
by Sir Henry Dobbs, he also notes the threat of the Shias in the following: 
The frontiers having thus been strengthened and the Turkish menace for the time staved 
off, the field was free to deal with the agitation of reactionary Shia divines against the 
elections for the Constituent Assembly. By July 1923, their demeanour towards King 
Faisal and towards the Iraq government had become intolerably arrogant, and King Faisal 
saw no other way than to authorize the deportation of their leaders, Sheikh Mahdi al 
Khalisi… [This] was followed by the voluntary exodus to Persia of several other 
prominent Persian divines as a public protest.
62
 
                                                          
61 Gertrude Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1927), 573. 
62 Ibid., 544. 
30 
 
In the above, it is clear that no distinction is made between the Shia and the Persians. 
Dobbs begins by noting the threat of the “Shia divines” and then makes reference to the exodus 
of the “Persian divines.” One can only assume that he uses the two interchangeably. Bell 
continues with this similar identification of the Shia as Persian when she explains the lack of 
representation of Shia in the acting Government. In one letter, Bell recalls the memory of an 
Iraqi asking her why a certain cleric wasn’t included in the government. In this recollection, she 
responded by highlighting the Persian descent of the individual cleric in question and thus his 
inability to serve on the Iraqi cabinet.
63
 In her words: “their [i.e. the Shia’s] leading people [are] 
the learned vines and their families are all Persian subjects.”  
To assess whether or not these Shias were truly of Persian origin or if their allegiance lay 
with Persia is beyond the scope of this thesis, and to a great degree, it is irrelevant to this analysis 
whether or not this link was fact or fiction. What matters is that there seems to be an intentional 
exclusion of the Shia people by the British mandate. These Shia within Iraq, regardless of their 
origin, had been placed under the new Iraqi borders by the mandate and the Sykes-Picot 
agreement. Thus, they were – and are – constituents of the Iraqi state. As Bell notes, they were – 
and remain – the majority of the state. The purposeful exclusion of this large group would 
inevitably lead to animosity based on sectarian religious divides as this is the identifying trait by 
which they were excluded from participating in the nascent state.  
Yet, despite these clear indications that the exclusion of Shia from power was a 
purposeful exercise by the British, the blame for sectarian division is later placed on the Sunnis 
in power. Whether true or false, it seems that the British imagination of the contentious Orient is 
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quite strong, even if their leaders show the same bias. In a letter written on January 22
nd
, 1921, 
Bell writes: 
I hear rumours that the Sunnis of Bagdad are considering whether it wouldn’t suit their 
book best to have a Turkish prince as King. They are afraid of being swamped by the 
Shias, against whom a Turk might be a better bulwark than a son of the Sharif. The 
present Government which is predominantly Sunni, isn’t [sic] doing anything to 
conciliate the Shias. They are considering a number of administrative appointments for 
the provinces; almost all the names they put are Sunnis, even for the wholly [sic] Shia 
province on the Euphrates, with the exception of Karbala and Nejd where even they 
haven’t [sic] the face to propose Sunnis…If they want popular native institutions, the 
Shias, who are in a large majority, must take their share.
64
 
 
This sentiment is at odds with Bell’s previous observation when she labeled Shias “one of 
the greatest problems.”65 The paternalistic tone is prevalent in the selected passage as well as 
others, with Bell appearing to offer sage advice to the Iraqis who were unable to rule fairly 
among their diverse population. Regardless of the attempts by the British, it is clear that it was 
not only the Shia who were opposed to the mandate and the way in which it ruled, despite 
attempts to categorize discontent as purely a Shia problem. As Bell herself states “It’s true that 
few are pleased, but they wouldn’t have been pleased with any line whatever.”66 
It is important to note that none of the above analysis claims that the constructs present 
during this time period were created by the British or during the British mandate. It would indeed 
be an oversimplification and factually inaccurate to exclusively blame the British for the 
sectarian conflicts that have paralyzed the country in recent years. During the Ottoman Empire, 
Sunni Iraqis were similarly favored over their Shia brethren, as there was also the same 
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contentious fear of the Shia’s potential connection to Persia. However, the British imagination 
did make its impact during the early years of the Iraqi state.  
Given the power and ability to create a new state, the British chose to strengthen tribal 
and sectarian identities. This has been highlighted by the explicit statements from Gertrude Bell 
and Stephen Longrigg, both of whom have negative perceptions of the Shia. The British brought 
forth a tribal system of organization, instead of supporting the already established educated 
middle class. Out of fear of the Ottoman influence and their belief in the Ottoman’s 
backwardness, the tribal sheikh policy emerged. Furthermore, Sunni tribes were favored over 
Shia ones, even in predominantly Shia-majority areas. This gave Sunni Iraqis power over Shia 
Iraqis and built the foundation of the sectarian history that has allowed for the development of 
Shia Iraqi sense of victimhood. As the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim Al-Haeri would state 
almost a century after the mandate in 2002, “The rights of the Shia have been violated for a long 
time and up to our period today… as a result of tyrannical governments.”67 As early as the Iraqi 
state’s inception in the 1920’s, the Iraqi Shia can point to a sectarian policy enacted by the state 
against them in favor of their Sunni counterparts. These nurtured feelings of sectarian 
victimhood would only be further aggravated throughout the decades, specifically in the period 
of the 1990s and after the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. 
This section aimed to give a brief look at and assessment of the early roots of 
sectarianism in the Iraqi state. The British mandate in Iraq and the attitude of the colonizers has 
been analyzed to focus on the possible signs of early sectarianism that were emphasized during 
the early twentieth century. While many eventful years followed, we now fast forward decades 
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later to the 1990s when sectarianism burgeoned as a result of intermestic interactions which are 
vital to the understanding of Shia-Sunni relations in recent years.   
 
The Baath in Power:  Minority Domination & Intermestics Reinforce Sectarianism 
We must not submerge ourselves in the theoretical pan-Arab and neglect the direct, local 
patriotic (al-watani). . . . We must speak of the Iraqi who comes from Sulaymaniyya [i.e., 
a Kurd] and he who comes from Basra [i.e., a Shia], without pointing to his ethnic 
origins. . . . Let us delete the words Arabs and Kurds and replace them with the term the 
Iraqi people.
68
 
The speaker of these reconciliatory words was none other than Saddam Hussein, the then 
Vice President, in a speech given in 1975 to Iraq’s teachers. This approach was generally sought 
by Saddam in his early years and up until the 1990s.
69
 In the beginning, the regime spent lavishly 
on supporting artists and poets, commissioning new festivals, building new museums and 
renovating older ones. Generally, the regime pursued a policy that celebrated Iraqi history as far 
back as not only the early Islamic era but also the Babylonians and Assyrians. According to 
Saddam in his early years, his Baathist vision for Iraq was not theocratic. He stated: “Our party is 
not neutral between atheism and faith. It is always on the side of faith, but it is not a religious 
party. . . . What we must do is to oppose the institutionalization of religion in the state and in 
society. . . . Let us return to the roots of our religion—but not bring it into politics.”70  
However, such liberal and unifying policies were ephemeral. Domestic and international 
interactions led Saddam to pursue a new method, one that unrepentantly and explicitly harbored 
sectarian sentiments. Jerry Long states that from 1968 to 1977, the regime had no religious 
overtones. However, from 1977 to 1989 this began to change with more Islamic themes in the 
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official state discourse. From 1989 and onward, Long described the period as one of “deliberate 
Islamic flag waving.”71 
This is not to say that the Shia-Sunni issue had been resolved prior to 1989. Briefly, we 
can return to the prior period and point to how sectarianism continued after the Iraqi mandate. 
During the days of the monarchy, there was a famous saying that permeated the Shia community. 
“The taxes are on the Shia, death is on the Shia, and the posts are for the Sunnis.”72 This clearly 
shows a sense of victimhood that continued throughout the twentieth century. After the 
monarchy fell, top posts still remained for Sunnis who held approximately eighty percent of the 
highest positions, with Shias only making up sixteen percent, despite their majority in the 
country. Even during the Baathist early years, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was 
made up of fourteen Arab Sunnis and one Kurd – with no Shia representation. By the 1980s, two 
Shias were part of the seven-person council. Saddam favored his own family members and the 
Tikritis tribe over others – most of whom were Sunni. The Islamic Call party, formed in 1957, 
was led by an Iraqi Shia who felt disenfranchised from politics and continued to remain active 
throughout the following decades.
73
 
Yet, despite many clashes and the arrest and execution of Shias from such parties 
throughout the 1970s and 80s, the government attempted to co-opt Shias through its policies. The 
Baathist government gave cash gifts to Shia communities and worked to improve infrastructure 
in Shia-majority areas, including the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.
74
 From 1974 until 1982, 
the government spent more than 100 million dollars in Karbala, a predominantly Shia area. In 
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general, things were looking up for the Shias who saw real improvements in their communities. 
The party aimed to not only improve the social development of the southern regime which was 
heavily Shia, but it also opened up new opportunities for Shias to participate in government. By 
1990, before the tides would turn once again, Shia held nearly the same portion of Baathist posts 
as their Sunni counterparts.
75
 Furthermore, they made up approximately twenty percent of the 
general posts in the Iraqi army and were heading approximately half of the state-owned 
enterprises. These improvements were, of course, aimed to sustain Saddam’s power and portray 
the Baathist party in a benevolent light. As long as the Shia did not present a threat to the ruling 
party, there was no reason for their total disenfranchisement.  
Two elements shifted the discourse and policies towards the Shia: the Iranian 
Revolutionary threat and the 1991 revolt. The Iranian Revolution presented an ideological threat 
to Saddam’s rule. Khomeinism was an ideology that, like Baathism, presented itself as total, able 
to encompass society and government.
76
 Its appeal to Iraqi Shia was a very real threat that 
Saddam faced. The secular nature of the Baathist party, which may have once been part of its 
appeal, now seemed to be a potential weakness. After the invasion of Iran by Iraq, Khomeini put 
the conflict in religious terms: “You are fighting to protect Islam, and [Saddam] is fighting to 
destroy Islam.” As a result of Iran’s assaults in religious terms, the Baathist regime began its 
transformation. The war with Iran became a jihad and Saddam was named a mujahid. Islamic 
terms became more common and the recitation of the Quran became a regular occurrence in the 
media.
77
 The two sides constituted the conflict along religious lines. All of this was in fact, not 
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outwardly sectarian in nature. This was an attempt to ensure the support and loyalty of Shias in 
Iraq, whom Saddam and the party feared would find the Iranian Islamic principles appealing. It 
didn’t take long for the regime to switch tactics again when the revolt of 1991 threatened 
Baathist power. The increased prevalence of Islamic terms and Islamic references meant a 
greater salience of religious identities. Even before the outright oppression of the Shia, such 
religious rhetoric became more central to Iraqi discourse and thought. 
The 1991 Revolt & Its Sectarian Legacy 
In 1991, as the Iraqi soldiers retreated from Kuwait in defeat, there was a sense of 
resentment towards the party as the nation felt the sharp sting of national humiliation.
78
 The 
international community had condemned the invasion and the weakness of the state seemed 
palpable. Days before the uprising, on Voice of America radio President George H.W. Bush 
encouraged Iraqis to “take matters in their own hands” and bring Saddam Hussein’s regime to an 
end.
79
 
 The exact details of the rebellion are not necessary for our purposes. It is enough to say 
that rebels attacked government institutions, intense fighting spread and important Shia holy sites 
were vandalized.
80
 Perhaps because of the war’s proximity to the southern region which was 
predominantly Shia, the rebellion took on a sectarian tone. Protesters lifted images of turbaned 
men, including Khomeini’s portrait. By March, all nine of the Shia-dominant governorates were 
in an uproar. The apparent sectarian nature of the rebellion dissuaded Sunnis from joining. A 
                                                          
78 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 68. 
79 Ehrenberg et. al., The Iraq Papers, 216-217. 
80 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 68.  
37 
 
Human Watch Report paints a dark picture of the events that followed.
81
 Thousands of Kurds 
and Shia were either executed or seized by the regime, according to the report which depicted 
disturbing details. 
In the remote marshes along the southern border with Iran, thousands of Shia who fled 
during the uprising lack adequate food, hygiene and medical care and are at risk of Iraqi 
military operations in the area.  Their numbers include active rebels, army deserters and 
displaced persons afraid to go home. Little is known with certainty about the numbers or 
magnitude of the military operations… [the] displaced population in the marshes has 
been virtually ignored by the world community.
82
 
Henceforth, the regime’s slogan became “There will be no Shia after today.”83 On March 
16, Saddam claimed that the rebellions were part of a larger foreign plot and specifically linked 
the rebellion to neighboring Iran.
84
 As James Baker noted, “The Iraqi Shia were quite naturally 
perceived as being aligned with Iran.” Shia clerics were put under house arrest and religious 
shrines were destroyed.
85
  
It is important here to note that the construction of Shia Iraqis as part of an Iranian 
conspiracy, a threatening “other,” came from the top and below. While one could simply put the 
responsibility of constructing the Shia “other” on the regime itself, this is overly simplistic and 
denies the people the power to constitute their own identities as well as the identity of the state. 
Narratives of the event point to the fact that the protests began by both Sunni and Shia Iraqis 
initially, but when the demonstrations took on more explicit “Shia” tones with the pictures of 
                                                          
81 Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992, 
accessed February 20, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ehrenberg et al., The Iraq Papers, 216-217. 
84 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 76. 
85 Ehrenberg et al., The Iraq Papers, 216-217. 
38 
 
Khomeini, among other signs, this discouraged the involvement of Sunnis.
86
 This narrative 
shows that the people themselves also viewed the Shia with suspicion, as they refused to be 
involved in what they perceived might constitute a Shia uprising. Had there not been a sense of 
sectarian identity, the Sunnis could have very well demonstrated along with the Shia, regardless 
of the images displayed. Instead, we see that the state and the people constituted the situation 
along sectarian lines. The Shias displayed “Shia” images – like Khomeini – and thus framed their 
plight around an explicitly Shia identity. Sunnis perceived the Shia framing as dangerous and 
thus did not join the demonstrations. The regime played the Sunnis against the Shia and 
instigated a sectarian attack on Shias. All of these factors led to sectarian tensions. Furthermore, 
not only did the consequences of the rebellion fuel sectarianism, but the outcome of the 1990’s 
sanctions by the United Nations pushed sectarianism to new heights.  
UN Sanctions Fuel Sectarian Strife 
The unprecedented severity and length of the UN sanctions enacted in 1990 along with 
the decades of war that plagued Iraq prior to the late twentieth century crippled Iraq and set in 
motion shifts in the social fabric of its society.
87
 According to the United Nations’ Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), real GDP per capita declined by 72 percent 
between 1990 and 1992 and again plummeted by 51 percent between 1992 and 1996. As 
incomes fell, food insecurity rose and overall health declined. The paternalistic state which had 
once been central to national economy and employment withdrew from its role in an attempt to 
focus on an equitable food rations programme. Iraq successfully averted famine but overall 
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nutrition levels and health saw a steep decline. In 1999, a UNICEF report documented a 75% 
reduction in Iraq’s GDP, doubled child mortality rate, increased malnutrition and mental 
illness.
88
 Citizens suddenly found the state inept and unable to provide services and support that 
people had grown accustomed to; the days of the state’s prominent role from birth to death was a 
thing of the past. While the state had previously employed nearly forty percent of the workforce, 
it could no longer afford to sustain such policies.
89
 Middle class state workers’ salaries decreased 
by nearly 80 percent from1991 to 1996. The state took a step back from its paternalistic role and 
it subjects were left to find a new way to function in a deprived society in which social 
development was clearly crumbling.
90
 Where did the Iraqi people have to turn?  
Echoing back to the British mandate period, the role of the tribe was revived as a result of 
the harsh reality that the state would no longer be able to support its citizens. Prior to the 
nineties, the tribe had been viewed as something backward for the latter half of the twentieth 
century.
91
 The Baath party found tribes to be a hindrance to social progress and reform. This is 
clear from the state’s attempt at decreasing the salience of tribal identities. In 1976, the party 
forbade tribal titles from being used. Perhaps this was to hide the fact that the party itself had a 
clearly tribal bias, with most of its members from the Tikrtis tribe. As Hanna Batatu says, “[The 
Tikrtis] role continues to be so critical that it would not be going too far to say that the Tikritis 
rule through the Ba’ath party, rather than the Ba’ath party through the Tikritis.”92 Regardless of 
the reason for the shift, the party’s policies were not encouraging of such tribal identities. 
                                                          
88Ehrenberg et al., The Iraq Papers, 2. 
89 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 94. 
90 Ibid., 89. 
91 Ibid., 93-95. 
92 Ibid. 
40 
 
However, with the realization that the party could no longer offer social solutions as it once had, 
policies shifted to support tribal allegiances. The state more explicitly dealt with tribes. Tribal 
recruitment became standard and glaringly apparent, especially in the area of security. Tribes 
were used to fill the vacuum of the state and became celebrated for their productive role in 
society. Once again, as in the time of the British, the shaikh became the focal point of contact 
between state personnel and the people, especially in the south and the countryside. The state 
even sponsored tribal shows of support, to further bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
and the illegitimacy of the uprisings in 1991. Saddam went so far as to say that the party had 
been mistaken in “inciting the people against feudalism.” And according to Saddam, the Baath 
was “the tribe encompassing all tribes.” It became official policy that progression in state 
positions was based on familial and tribal roots. For the first time since the seventies, tribal titles 
and backgrounds of party members were published in the nineties. Tribal justice became 
permissible by law and the regime went about coopting tribal leaders to join its ranks. 
Furthermore, the state embraced Sunni tribes while only a few Shia ones enjoyed new 
government support. Regardless, Shia tribes were marginalized, especially those in the south.
93
 
The 1991 rebellion had put a mark on the southern tribes, which were heavily Shia. Fanar 
Haddad claims that perhaps it was regionalism that actually led to this imbalance, with the tribes 
from Western Iraq and Tikrit as those closest to the regime and the others falling behind. 
However, considering the state’s explicit aggression towards Shias, it would be difficult to 
assume that religion didn’t have a role to play. As one tribal leader from the Babel governorate 
claims: 
All the water is with them. Here we have a drought, there’s barely any water for our 
lands; but go to Tharthar [lake in north western Iraq] and the water is bursting….. I was 
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once in a gathering of sheikhs from the western region – Tikritis and all sorts. One of 
them – in my presence mind you – reprimanded another: ‘we hear that you gave your 
daughter [in marriage] to someone from Qurna [near Basra].’ The man assured everyone 
– and am there with them – that the groom was a good man and from a good family. Then 
he was asked: ‘next thing you’ll be giving your daughters to Najafis!’ to which he 
replied, ‘I would sooner give her to a dog from Tikrit.94 
 
Such regionalism and tribalism no doubt had sectarian undertones which supported 
reinforcing feelings of victimhood, especially given the other acts by the state. Islam became an 
official part of the discourse, specifically with the “Faith Campaign” launched in 1994.95 This 
encouraged stricter adherence to Islamic principles, including the encouragement of women to 
wear the veil. The regime banned alcohol from all public spaces in the same year. Ancient 
Islamic punishments including amputation became legal. The person to mosque ratio rose 
substantially from 1:37,000 in the 1950s to 1:3,500 in the 1990s. The most critical aspect of 
these Faith Campaigns to our analysis is the Sunni beliefs from which they were derived. The 
official discourse began to outright condemn the Shia, including in a series of articles in the Al-
Thawra Daily newspaper. Pointing to the Shia rituals of Ashura, which had been banned since 
1977, the below expert explicitly questions Shia traditions.  
When we criticize in order to evaluate an aspect of our errors… we will not be driven to 
self-flagellation or self harm like the self harm and lashing of bodies and selves in Ashura 
in the manner exported to us by foreigners.  We thank God that we repudiated this before 
now and we hope to repudiate other alien norms and adoptions which are harmful.
96
 
Intermestics Reinforce Sectarian Divides 
The preceding details were necessary before delving into a deeper analysis of how 
intermestics worked to support the construction of sectarianism. The events described fully 
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portray the complexity of the relationship between international and domestic elements in 
changing the dynamics of a society and bringing greater salience to sectarian tensions. The 
uprising of 1991 is analytically intriguing because it shows how sectarian tensions in Iraq in 
1991 were impacted by not only the domestic but the international situation.  
 The 1991 uprising came in the midst of a greater systemic battle for the identity of the 
region after the Iranian Revolution. Regimes across the region took measures to quell domestic 
dissent.
97
 The Iranian Revolution presented a threat to status-quo regimes in the Middle East, 
who feared similar events within their own borders. Had there not been such an imminent threat 
perceived at the time, perhaps the reaction would not have been so quick to target Shias 
specifically and forge policies that fueled sectarian sentiments. 
The humiliation Iraqis felt could further be echoed in the international arena, as the UN 
condemned the invasion of Kuwait. Iraqis felt that humiliation as the soldiers came home from 
the battlefield, distraught and having failed the mission which they had been promised would 
bring glory. Iraqis were encouraged to revolt by both international and domestic forces – 
explicitly by President George H.W. Bush. The nature of the uprisings was further manipulated 
by the Saddam regime to make it appear less attractive to Sunni citizens. By shedding light on 
the religious tones of the rebellion, Saddam ensured the isolation of the movement and brought 
greater salience to the religious aspect. From then on, his policies further agitated Shia 
sentiments of victimhood since they were at the center of the regime’s attacks and their fellow 
Sunnis had greater privileges post-1991.  
International pressure from the United Nations sanctions agitated domestic occurrences 
even further. While the Iraqi economy had been suffering, and surely would have suffered 
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further due to its failed invasion of Kuwait, the literature is in consensus about the severity of the 
sanctions on the social fabric of Iraqi society. Annihilating the state’s ability to fulfill its role in 
supporting the people through its services forced the state to rely on the tribal system to take up 
its mantle.
98
 Consequently, this brought greater salience to sectarian identities, since the tribal 
system has clear religious divisions as well. Not only was there a heighted sense of religious 
identity due to the divisive rhetoric of the regime but society was now organized around 
sectarian lines. 
 
The American Invasion: Re-Constituting Iraqi Identity from the Outside 
In every age there have been people who considered that an individual had one overriding 
affiliation so much important in every circumstance to all others that it might legitimately 
be called his ‘identity.’ For some it was the nation, for others, religion or class. But one 
only has to look at the various conflicts being fought out all over the world today to 
realize that no one allegiance has absolute supremacy. When people feel their faith is 
threatened, it is their religious affiliation that seems to reflect their whole identity. But if 
their mother tongue or their ethnic group is in danger, then they will fight ferociously 
against their own co-religionists.
99
 
 The above passage by Lebanese writer Amin Maalouf is pertinent to our Constructivist 
analysis of Iraqi sectarian conflict. Earlier periods assessed, including the British mandate and 
the Baathist regime in the late twentieth century, are foundational to the proceeding discussion. 
Without the understanding of previous instances that fueled religious conflict, one cannot 
understand the eruption of tensions in our modern period. No singular event created such 
divisions. The complex interplay in both the international and domestic arena, which was 
supported by certain perceptions from different players, essentially constructed our current 
                                                          
98 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 100. 
99 Imranali Panjwani and Charles Tripp, The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community 
in Iraq, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012, 145. 
44 
 
moment. There was no inevitability in the violence we have recently seen in Iraq. It was the 
power and fear of ideas (such as Khomeinism) and the emphasis of identity politics that led to 
what the world continues to witness today. The following section aims to assess the role of the 
U.S. invasion and American policies as well as Iraqi actions and reactions in fueling sectarianism 
in Iraq in the twenty-first century. 
In 2002, just a year before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, exiled Shias abroad came together to 
write a manifesto based on what they perceived as the unique Shia experience which had been 
built by decades – if not centuries – of resentment.  The group called for a new Iraq based on 
democracy, federalism and the respect of the human rights of all citizens. “The Iraqi Shia 
problem is now a globally recognized fault line and is no longer restricted to the confines of 
Iraq’s territory,” the Declaration of the Shia of Iraq begins.100 Very clearly they claim that, 
“Iraq’s political crisis had nothing to do with either social discrimination or a latent Shia sense of 
inferiority towards the Sunnis, or vice versa. It is entirely due to the conduct of an overtly 
sectarian authority determined to pursue a policy of discrimination solely for its own interests of 
control.” The declaration dismissed the idea of Iraqi Shia creating their own state separate from 
Sunnis, but it advocated for a federal system that would be fair to all sects within society. Other 
exiled Iraqis came to support the declaration. What would come of these ideas after the Baathist 
regime fell? 
On October 16, 2003, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UNSC 
Resolution 1511, effectively bringing about the US mandate of Iraq.
101
 Thus came yet another 
opportunity to reshape Iraqi political society from the outside. The British had already had their 
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chance. The Iraqis had formed several governments, including that of Saddam’s most recent 
Baathist party. The potential for Iraqi society to fall apart completely was high. Two National 
Intelligence Council classified reports for President Bush indicated that an invasion of Iraq 
would likely mount support for political Islamic parties and further the sectarian divide in Iraqi 
society.
102
What would the Americans do? How would they impact Iraqi history?  
As time has already shown, the impact of U.S. influence has been no more successful in 
ameliorating sectarian divides. While the sectarian legacy of history shares part of the 
responsibility for the events that have transpired during the new millennium, the impact of U.S. 
policy cannot be underestimated. The new government formed by the U.S. further enforced 
previous divisions and played an instrumental role in exacerbating sectarian tensions, resulting in 
a bloody civil war and general unrest in Iraqi society.  
Creating an Inept Council Divided by Sectarian Ties 
 The U.S. attempted to form yet another governing system in 2003, one which shares 
many similarities to previous ones analyzed. The plan from the start aimed to create an Iraqi 
Interim Authority which would be comprised of Iraqi nationals who would administer the 
country under the authority of the occupying forces.
103
 Through an ambiguous process, U.S. 
Chief Administrator to Iraq Paul Bremer established a new Iraqi governing council. Bremer set 
up a quota system that would be used to select council members. Based on the ratio of communal 
identities, it was determined that the council would be made up of thirteen Shia Arabs, five Sunni 
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Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkoman and one Christian.
104
 Leadership of the council was set up to 
rotate between members, but any power they were given remained under the Coalition 
Provisional Authority of the US and Great Britain.
105
 
The council lacked democratic legitimacy and essentially divided Iraqi society based on 
ethnicity and religion. The occupying forces chose the council in a non-transparent process and 
gave Iraqis no voice in the new system, a system which had promised to bring about democracy. 
Iraqi national and Professor Wisal al-Azzawi, Dean of the College of Political Sciences of 
Nehrein University, points to one of the deep flaws behind the council. 
Why didn’t they ask our opinion? ‘What role has been given to scientists, technocrats, 
intellectuals, businessmen, unions? Because of the way it was secretly appointed, the 
Council appears very much an American creation imposed on the Iraqi people… The 
democratic process does not happen in a day or two, and should not be connected to a 
handful of people who collaborated with the occupation.
106
 
 
 Not only did the new system bolster domestic pre-existing sectarian identities but it 
added a new element to the conflict – a division between exiled Iraqis, mainly Shia, and those 
who had remained in the country. The parallel cannot be overlooked. Similar to the British who 
had chosen to give power to tribal systems, as they were afraid of the educated class that had 
been nurtured under Ottoman rule, the U.S. chose to empower Iraqi exiles, more specifically 
Shia Iraqis who had been disenfranchised during the Saddam years, rather than risk placing 
potential Saddam-sympathizers to the helm of power. 
 The system appears to have been set up for failure from the start – or without much 
concern for its success. According to an interview with a political science professor who had 
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been part of the government formation process, members chosen in the council were selected 
based on their support of the occupation.
107
 Furthermore, according to this source, the long 
political process for choosing these members was actually simply designed to see who would be 
the most supportive of US policies in Iraq. Thus, sectarian identity and loyalty to U.S. occupying 
forces became the main criterion for choosing the new leaders of the country. This same 
anonymous source also revealed other sordid details. Bremer personally dismissed the 
importance of the Council, viewing them as insignificant parts of the political scene. The 
interview with the same source notes that members of the Council feared Bremer’s power over 
them, as he could easily dismiss any contentious debate by pointing to the illegitimacy of the 
council itself since it wasn’t chosen through any democratic or representative process.  
Interviews with Iraqis reveal that in the public perception, Bremer is essentially re-
creating the oppressive conditions that existed under Saddam: unilateral decisions to 
isolate Iraqis, reneging on promises, parades and heavy security, twisted truths about 
improving living conditions, insensitivity to the daily suffering of the people, the 
disappearance of Iraqi civilians and press censorship.
108
 
There seemed to be no effort by the new international occupier to create a cohesive 
society, and the blunders of the Americans only served to reignite sectarian strife through 
policies and actions which brought even greater salience to sectarian identity. The Coalition 
Provisional Authority de-Baathification program succeeded in pushing the Sunnis to the margins 
of society. Since the Sunnis occupied a disproportionate majority of Baathist state bureaucratic 
and security positions, they felt the greatest impact of the government overhaul which cleansed 
out former state employees. According to estimates, anywhere from 30,000 to 120,000 Iraqis 
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were left jobless due to de-Baathification.
109
 The U.S. even disbanded the Iraqi army, putting 
400,000 trained young solider out of work with scant job options.
110
 This large group of skilled 
soldiers provided a strong base for the sectarian militias that later formed. These changes not 
only built resentment towards the occupying forces and the new system but they also gave 
Sunnis reason to be suspicious of the cooperating Shias.  
“Othering” Shia Iraqis - from Persian Snake to Western Agent  
The discourse of Sunni insurgent groups can shed light on the sentiment of Iraqi Sunnis 
about the U.S. occupation and the cooperative Shias. A 2004 interview with a Jaish Muhammad 
spokesperson by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting reveals the new Sunni Iraqi 
perception of the indistinguishable character of the Shia in power and the occupying forces. 
When asked about the group’s position on the Iraqi Governing Council, most of whom were 
Shia, the spokesman stated: 
Our position is clear – they are all spies, traitors, and agents for the Americans. First, they 
do not represent the people of Iraq because they are not elected. They are appointed by 
their masters, the Americans. Second, the appointed Governing Council members were 
[in exile during the Saddam regime]. They do not understand Iraqis suffering and Arab 
traditions. [They] were distorted by the Western life they lived.
111
 
 This reveals an interesting new development in the “othering” of the Shia. Since many 
members of the new government had been exiles, the Sunnis perceived them as “westernized.” 
Thus, while at one historical moment the condemnatory characteristic of the Shia “otherness” 
was in connection to Persia, the new means of ostracizing the group and further segregating the 
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identities of the Shias and Sunnis now became the link between the Shia and the Western 
occupier. To be Shia became synonymous with traitor by association.  
This new condemning connection between the Shia and occupiers had real implications. 
The armed insurgency initially began by targeting foreign troops, but soon turned towards Shia 
targets as well. Sunni extremist groups, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq, began 
to attack Shias that supported the Americans.
112
 According to al-Zarqawi, “[The Shia are] the 
insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy 
and the penetrating venom.”113 
 These revived tensions were clearly a consequence of complex intermestic dynamics that 
had taken shape over years and decades. Shias, who had been marginalized and persecuted 
during the Saddam era and even previously, found their fortunes had finally changed for the 
better. The Americans were willing to empower them – even if it was partially a ruse and under 
the occupying authority. On the other hand, the Sunnis, who had grown accustomed to privileges 
under the Baathist regime, were feeling the bitter sting of the shifting tides, as they saw their role 
in society diminish and their security vanish. The “other” to the Sunni Iraqi had transformed 
from the suspicious “Persian Shia” to the enemy “Westernized Shia” who was willing to 
cooperate with the powers that had stripped the Sunnis of their previous privileges.  
 These patterns of “othering” continued throughout the next several years until the 
eruption of the Iraqi civil war. Violent sectarian attacks went back and forth between Sunnis and 
Shias, with the United States switching sides later in the conflict. After the 2005 parliamentary 
elections made the sectarian divide even clearer – with a generally strongly religious body 
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dominated by Shias – the U.S. became hesitate of its Shia-empowerment strategy. Instead of 
continuing its support of the Shia, the occupiers reached out to Sunnis to take junior roles in the 
new state and toned down their full support of Shias, targeting Shia militias and taking back 
some of the powers that the group had gained after the occupation.
114
The U.S. had effectively 
supported the radicalization of Sunni militants, helped the Shia take power and Iraq had become 
a breeding ground of jihadists and a magnet for extremist Islamic groups. As one report 
summarizes:  
The U.S. occupation of Iraq further deepened sectarian tensions. As the U.S. searched for 
Iraqi political collaborators to establish a pro-occupation government, it marginalized the 
secular political forces, seen as too nationalist, in favor of more compliant religious 
parties and groupings.... The U.S. promoted (and the mass media accepted) an 
ethnic/religious conception of Iraqi politics that did not acknowledge the long supremacy 
of secular nationalism and did not reflect the complex ethnic mix and the diversity of 
many Iraqi cities and regions, such as Mosul, Basrah and especially multi-ethnic 
Baghdad.
115
 
 
Conclusion 
The sectarianism that ignited in Iraq in 2007 cannot be explained or understood by an 
isolated event or occurrence. The complex interplay of intermestics in the Iraqi arena throughout 
the course of history resulted in the civil war that continues to threaten the country and region 
today. Iraqi society had already been deeply divided prior to the U.S. invasion. We can see this 
from the disproportionate representation of Sunnis in power during the Baathist regime. The 
active engagement of sectarian discourse by Saddam Hussein against the Shias only further 
fueled divisions. The ostentatious repression of the Shia population after the 1991 rebellion and 
the sectarian slogans that the regime raised all helped create a tension that was on the verge of 
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ignition. While these components are mainly domestic, one cannot ignore the important role 
played by the existential threat of the Iranian Revolution, which gave the Iraqi regime much to 
fear. Prior to the modern period, the foundation of sectarian society had already been instilled 
through Orientalist policies enacted under the British, who had divided society along sectarian 
lines and favored Sunni tribes over Shia counterparts. 
The American invasion and its consequential influence on Iraqi society threw the match 
that lit the final flame. There is no doubt that dividing the new governing council by communal 
identities and no other apparent qualifications helped bring greater salience to sectarian 
identities. Perhaps it was the American perception of the sectarian nature of Iraqi society that led 
to such a system. The de-Baathification of Iraq predominantly impacted Sunnis who suddenly 
found themselves at the fringes of society, without work or access to power. Finally, disbanding 
the Iraqi Army left hundreds of thousands of trained and disenfranchised men without any reason 
to support the new regime. The history of Shia-Sunni tensions, which has been described and 
analyzed at length at least from the period of the British mandate, gave a solid foundation for the 
conflict between the two groups. Sunnis had a history of fearing “the lurking snake” that was 
symbolized by the Shia, who had once been accused of harboring loyalty to Iran and who now 
became representative of another enemy that threatened and disturbed their Sunni brothers – the 
Americans.
116
 
Chapter 3 – Constructing Sectarianism in Syria   
Introduction 
a citizen afraid to pray –  
What if the State Police stake out the prayer line?  
They might say I tried to contact the Merciful on High  
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Worse, they might accuse me  
of perpetrating faith  
- God, what a place
117
 
The above was written by the prolific Syrian writer Nizar Kabbani in 1984. Religion is 
invoked in fear. “A citizen afraid to pray,” he writes. The narrator worries that he will be accused 
of “perpetrating faith,” as though faith is a crime to be punished. Of which faith does he speak? 
The author alludes to a reality within his society in Syria, two short years after a massacre by 
state security in the predominantly Sunni city of Hama. Kabbani wrote this poignant poem 
describing the fear of the state and revealing the salience of sectarian tensions nearly three 
decades prior to the Syrian civil war in 2011. The construction of sectarian identities and 
divisions must thus be traced further back to understand its roots.  
 This chapter aims to assess the construction of sectarianism in Syria through a historic 
analysis of three periods. The chapter begins with an assessment of the French Mandate in Syria 
in the early twentieth century, as this is the period which first brought forth the idea of the Syrian 
state and made it a reality. Given the tumultuous nature of the period of coups before the Baathist 
regime successfully established itself, this period is skipped over. Instead, this thesis goes 
through an analysis of the state under Hafiz al-Assad, followed by an assessment of the regime 
under his son in the new millennium. The aim of this historic analysis will be to analyze the key 
components that led to the construction of Syria as a sectarian state by looking at the underlying 
agent and system roots.  
 
The French Mandate: Orientalist Thought & the Early Divisive Vision of a Syrian State 
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After the fall of the so-called ‘Sick man of Europe,’ it was the British who first supported 
the creation of a new state in the area now demarcated as Syria.
118
 With the support of the 
British, between 1918 and 1920, the Hashemite Amir Faysal ruled over an Arab government in 
Damascus. Though his control was limited, his supporters claimed sovereignty over geographic 
Syria and in March 1920 proclaimed him King of Syria. By July 1920, the French had 
successfully kicked out Faysal from Damascus and established their own rule in the various areas 
that would later become Syria, all with the legitimacy of the mandate under the newly-
established League of Nations. The French ruled over a fragmented land, with separate states in 
Damascus and Aleppo as well as autonomous rule for the Druze and Alawi. Damascus and 
Aleppo would eventually merge in January 1925 and the Alawi and Druze areas would remain 
separate until 1936. 
The French inherited a diverse land in the Levant in general and in the soon-to-be Syrian 
lands specifically. In 2011, the composition of Syria was incredibly diverse religiously and 
marginally diverse ethnically. The estimated population composition by 2011 was: 64 percent 
Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Kurds, another 10 percent Alawi, 9 percent Christians, 3 percent Druze 
and 1 percent Shia.
119
 The Alawi minority is of particular interest to this thesis, as this small 
minority would play an important role in Syria’s modern history. Though the religious identity of 
the Alawi has been contested, since the 1920s at the time of the mandate they have continued to 
constitute their religious identity as part of Shia Islam, meaning they are part of the religious 
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minorities of Syria.
120
 During the mandate period, the French would have to navigate this diverse 
environment, which also included ethnic minorities like the Armenians and the Circassians.  
Orientalist Ideas Re-Constitute Identities around Religious Divisions 
It is well-documented throughout the literature that French officials adopted divisive 
communitarian politics, politics based on religious sectarian identities.
121
 According to Benjamin 
White’s elaborate study on the concept of minorities during the mandate period, the very 
concepts of “minority” and “majority” gained coinage and value during French mandated Syria. 
Such ideas are powerful constructs that give salience to sectarian identities, especially given the 
fact that the terms emerged around religious notions.  
According to White, French officials strengthened the former millet system of the 
Ottoman Empire and actually further built the millet system’s divisive nature.122 Through the 
millet system, the Ottomans categorized different non-Muslim groups according to religion - 
Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians, Jews, etc. The millet system gave each 
community political autonomy and handed authority to either the patriarch, as in the case with 
the Christian denominations, or the chief rabbi, in the case of the Jewish communities.  
Like the British during their reign over the Iraqi mandate, due to the dominant Orientalist 
discourse the French perceived the Ottoman system as static and thus interpreted the millet 
system as completely divisive, with little to no interaction between the different groups within it.  
According to the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Beirut, who was also in charge 
of the Syrian areas, “each community is a little people, jealous of its personality, which has its 
                                                          
120 Aslam Farouk-Alli, “Sectarianism in Alawi Syria: Exploring the Paradoxes of Politics and Religion,” 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 34:3 (2014), 212-213. 
121 White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East, 40-45. 
122 Ibid., 47. 
55 
 
chief, national and religion at the same time; they are so many nations, and in effect they carry 
that name.”123 This powerful idea re-constituted the system and thus the identities within Syria 
into a more divisive society than had been the case under Ottoman rule.   
The French thus segregated Syrian areas and people by religious segments. The French 
Personal Status Law legally created “Syrians” for the first time, and religious identity became the 
central element that would determine the policies and laws that applied to certain groups.
124
 
Similarly, the census categorized people by religion.
125
 Unprecedented administrative actions 
divided society along religious lines. The French distributed seats to representative bodies on 
religious communal grounds and gave legal autonomy in matters of personal status to 
communities which had not been autonomous prior to the mandate. Article 6 of the mandate 
charter further reinforced this emphasis on religious affiliation. The article stated that “Respect 
for the personal status of the various peoples and their religious interests shall be fully 
granted.”126 Furthermore, the French granted territorial autonomy to certain religiously defined 
groups. According to White, the Ottoman Empire had actually begun diminishing the legal 
distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims under the millet system since the mid-nineteenth 
century, though they retained the personal status law in general. Thus, the powerful Orientalist 
French ideas pushed forth policies based on a reality that no longer existed. According to Syrian 
expert Eyal Zisser:  
Indeed, immediately after taking control of the entire Levant in 1920, the French acted to 
fragment the area…The French intention was to ensure their future control over this 
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territory, once it had fallen into their hands. Even when they set up the Syrian state at the 
end of the 1920s, they hampered the establishment and operation of its governmental 
institutions. Rather they continued to strengthen and entrench the forces of disunity and 
divisiveness in Syrian society, including sectarian and regional rivalries and the gulf 
between the urban and rural populations. The legacy of French Mandatory rule would 
later prove a handicap for the post-independence Syrian regime.
127
 
 France’s divisive policy allowed for the burgeoning of several autonomous regions which 
would later be incorporated into the Syrian state. Small state-lets were created in the Latakia 
region, with its Alawi majority, and the Jabal al-Druze with its Druze majority.
128
 While the 
Ottomans had let these areas rule autonomously informally, partially due to their remote 
locations, the mandate formally gave these groups independence. Under High Commissioner 
Damien de Martel, a religious decree was issued on 13 March 1936 which further embedded 
religious divisions into law.
129
 Communities – defined by the Personal Status Law by religion – 
would be required to submit to their own communal laws, which would be based on their 
religious texts and traditions. Sunnis rose up in opposition to such a policy at the time but they 
were only successful in delaying the enactment of the law, which the French pushed forth 
regardless of popular opinion. While the Ottoman Empire recognized no distinct sects among 
Muslims, the French expanded the millet system by including different Muslim groups as distinct 
groups, including the Druze and Alawis. The French enforced this new frame on even the 
smallest of populations, like the Isma’ilis who had no official religious authority to consult. 
The deliberate construction of the new Syrian society around religious lines was quite 
apparent by France’s refusal to acknowledge ethnolinguistic minorities, regardless of their push 
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for communal rights.
130
 Kurdish and Circassian demands and pleas would continue to be ignored 
during the French mandate. Circassians requested recognition of political rights as a minority in 
1928 and were refused by the French. The High Commissioner claimed:  
Under the name ‘communities’ are generally designated groupings of individuals of the 
same religion and the same rite… This definition of communities evidently excludes any 
other groups whose individuals are united by links other than confessional links 
(community of religion and of rite). The Tcherkess [Circassians] are of Sunni Muslim 
religion and cannot, from the confessional point of view, form a distinct community. 
Empowering the Minority: Disenfranchising the Sunnis & the Fear of Nationalism 
Since the Sunni Muslims were perceived as the most ‘nationalistic,’ the French feared the 
threat they could present if the law recognized the group’s communal rights. Kurds, who are also 
predominantly Sunni Muslims, presented a similar problem to the French mandate. France thus 
focused its efforts on minorities who were perceived as harmless and supportive of French rule 
and also as an application of the principle of “divide and rule.” 
 A combination of factors also led to a clear religious bias in the Syrian army during the 
mandate period. The French recruited predominantly from outside of the central capital, which 
meant a disproportionate amount of minorities joined the military.
131
 The result of such policies 
led to an over-representation of the Alawi and Druze, who only made up approximately 13 
percent of the population at the time.
132
 By 1944, the Alawis were clearly over-represented 
among soldiers, though they still had poor representation in the officer corps and within 
politics.
133
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Economic and political factors also reinforced this recruitment strategy. Wealthy Sunni 
Arab landowners and businessmen – who were the main leaders of the Arab nationalist 
movement – refused to send their children to military training. Not only did nationalism play a 
role in their disengagement with the army, but society perceived military service as a low-class 
career.
134
 On the other hand, the army attracted those who hoped to move up the social ladder, 
those like the marginalized religious minorities from rural regions. The Alawi and Druze were 
among the minorities who flocked to join the army, with the enthusiastic encouragement of the 
French. Furthermore, after recruiting these mainly minority soldiers into the mandate’s army, the 
men were used as part of special forces to suppress rebellions, which were predominantly led by 
Arab Sunnis.
135
 Given these factors, it is not surprising to see the clear frustration of the majority 
Sunni population. According to one High Commissioner: 
The Muslim community in general complains of having lost, since the occupation, and 
without compensation, the major part of its privileges. Above all it complains of being 
subjected to a regime of exception, which places it in a state of manifest inferiority vis-à-
vis the other communities.
136
 
Silencing Visions of Unity 
The previous international politics-from-above events can be contrasted with the 
domestic sentiment within Syria, which paints a different picture of the Syria that the people 
imagined and hoped to constitute. In an editorial written during the early years of the mandate, a 
Christian newspaper editor, Yusuf al-‘ssa, proposed the Prophet’s birthday as a national holiday 
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to rally ‘all the Arabophone communities.”137 According to al-‘ssa, “our country contains only 
one, Arab, stock.”  
Alawi scholar Abd al-Rahman al-Khayr also played a central role in combatting the 
divisive constructs of the French.
138
 Al-Khayr brought the Alawi into the Shia identity, as they 
had previously been pushed to the peripheries and not recognized as Muslims by most scholars 
and Sunni Muslims. In 1937, Al-Khayr wrote:  
The Nusayris, as they were once called, and the Alawis as they are called now in the 
period of the [French] occupation, are one of the Muslim sects … They are imamate 
Muslims and pure Arabs. For many reasons—mainly the pressure of some tyrannical 
rulers in the Islamic period—they took refuge in the mountains of this country. 
Perhaps what is most interesting about this drive is the importance of the Alawi “genuine 
Muslim” concept. Al-Khayr brought forth a renewed and more Shia-orthodox ideology into the 
Alawi doctrine and continued to advocate for Alawis to be considered “genuine Muslims” until 
he died in 1986. Why would the originality of the religion be of central importance to scholars if 
the identity of “Muslim” wasn’t central to the identity of the Syrian? The existence of this 
argument among scholars shows that there was a strong conception of Alawi exceptionalism – 
their “otherness.” If this were undisputed, if sentiment of Alawis inclusivity into the general 
communal (Syrian) identity were real then there would be no need for such elaboration and 
decades of work. In order to be accepted as part of the general Syrian identity, an Islamic 
heritage seemed to be a central element, even according to Christians like al-‘ssa. Thus, there 
needed to be an acceptance of the Alawis as part of the overall Muslim identity of the country, 
and it was central to the Alawis to be perceived within and outside of the community as 
“imamate Muslims and pure Arabs.”  
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Yusuf al-‘ssa’s editorial also aimed to unify the divisive identity that was being 
constituted by French policies and discourse. By pushing for the prophet’s birthday as a unifying 
symbolic day, al-‘ssa also pushed forth the inclusion of the Christian community into a common 
identity with others. Additionally, High Commissioner Damien de Martel’s claim in a New York 
Times interview that France was in Syria to protect the country’s Christian minorities led to 
protests among Christian nationalists in Aleppo.
139
  
On the other hand, in treaty negotiations in 1936, a plea was sent by Alawi and Christian 
members of the representative council stating that “the populations of this government belong to 
different Communities, each one having its beliefs, traditions and distinct customs. Relative to 
Syria as a whole, they constitute minorities that cannot and do not wish to be incorporated into 
Syrian Unity in any way.”140  
Understanding National Identity and the Concept of Minorities 
These complex matters point to a central issue from the beginning of the creation of the 
Syrian state – national identity. The state system originally put forth by the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648, which had only applied to Europeans, was pushed onto non-European groups in the 
early twentieth century.
141
 American President Woodrow Wilson’s project to universalize the 
sovereign state beyond European powers brought forth with it the mandate-system, which aimed 
to eventually create states. Arguments for a unified Syrian state, like those of al-‘ssa and others, 
reinforced the state system by giving it priority. Those for Syrian unification supported in 
constituting Wilson’s state-system vision. Those opposed to unification that sought their own 
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small state sovereignty, like parts of the Alawi community, who negotiated for their 
independence in 1936, also legitimized the state-system by reinforcing its validity and claiming 
the importance of their own sovereignty.  
After the formation of the League of Nations, the nation-state became the only 
internationally legitimate form of independent state.
142
 This legitimacy within the international 
community was granted only by the League. The mandate charter encouraged the divisive 
politics pursued by the French. In Article 1 of the mandate charter, it required that the mandatory 
state – France in this case – to privilege local autonomies. Article 6 guaranteed the personal 
status and religious interests of peoples, which has already been assessed. According to White, 
during the early mandate period, there was no constituted identity of “minority” because it was 
not yet a term of relevance. However, looking at these same facts, one can point to the basic 
foundation of sectarianism laid out by our earlier analysis. The terms of the mandate and the 
policies enacted upon the people produced a sectarian divide by increasing the representation of 
smaller religious groups over the larger Sunni majority. Thus, it is important to note that the 
interaction between France and the mandated territory through these early years created a basis 
for future tensions. It is equally important to understand the weight of the state system as it 
brought into focus the concepts of minorities and majorities, concepts which only served to 
aggravate sectarian tensions. 
According to White’s assessment of the concept of minority, prior to the mandate Syrian 
society rarely used the term “minority” or any related words. By the 1930s, White claims that 
Syrian and French officials were regularly using the term.
143
 For this thesis, the importance of 
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the term “minority” is that the concept is intimately linked to sectarianism. If a state perceives its 
identity as split between minorities and a majority and this is the predominantly salient form of 
identification, then the state identity is sectarian in nature. This is unlike states that hold these 
concepts of minorities and majorities within their state identities but have an overriding identity 
that forms a unified communal state identity. Members of the community who sought minority 
protection under the French not only gave credence to the mandate system, but also supported re-
constituting the mandate system under the League of Nations. Thus, we will briefly assess 
White’s findings and analyze the implication for sectarianism in Syria during the mandate 
period. 
In 1936, Syria was partially successful in gaining independence and being recognized by 
the League of Nations.
144
 However, under the agreement, France still had the right to intervene 
on behalf of minorities, which was possible due to the minority treaties within the international 
law of states. This law gave minorities the power to call on a higher authority than the Syrian 
government. According to White, this reconstituted groups based on minority-majority ideas. 
White’s survey of l’Asie Francaise, a bulletin edited by the High Commissioner Robert de Caix, 
shows that articles discussing the Levant using the term minority from 1915 to 1932 are 
approximately 70 pages, which is considered infrequent given the length of the articles and the 
approximately 17 year period. However, in a much shorter period of six years, from 1933 to 
1939, the mention of minorities also runs to 70 pages.
145
 This shows the increased use of the 
term and thus the increased salience of the minority-majority identification. 
Constructing Sectarianism during the Mandate 
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I now aim to synthesize the Syrian-mandate period through a Constructivist analysis, first 
through a unit-level interaction analysis and then zooming outward to assess the system in which 
these sectarian notions came to life. There is one essential question that must be asked first: why 
did the French perceive Syrian nationalism as a threat? This powerful idea, of the danger of 
Syrian nationalism to French interests, essentially led the French to support the growth of a 
sectarian system within Syria, which thus reinforced sectarian identities. This idea was due in 
part to France’s desire to sustain influence in the country – and the region generally. Thus, 
France came to perceive its interests as opposed to the interests of nationalists. As Wendt so 
rightly stated “amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.”146 Since Sunni Muslims 
were the most likely to hold nationalistic sentiments, they were therefore perceived as an 
adversary and France enacted policies in favor of other religious groups, mainly Alawis and 
Druze who were viewed as less likely to pose a threat.  
The Syrian role in helping constitute this identity is also essential. France’s initial 
divisive vision of Syrian society would simply be a meaningless notion if it were not for the 
Syrians constituting themselves within this frame as well. How can we tell that Syrians did 
perceive these same ideas of sectarian religious divisions? Syrians who accepted the French 
mandate and actually sought the support of the French in protecting their “minority rights” gave 
credence to the very notion of “minority” while simultaneously supporting in constituting the 
role of the League of Nations and France as arbitrators in Syrian affairs. Those who sought to 
create a religiously inclusive notion of the Syrian identity – like Yusuf al-‘ssa – also show that 
sectarian identities were powerful enough that they needed to be combatted with unifying visions 
of what it means to be “Syrian.”  
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Expanding outward to view the system as a whole, we can see that these powerful ideas 
were accepted within the international system as a whole. The League of Nations sanctioned the 
mandate and thus supported in constituting the role of the French as an authority over Syria and 
other regions. Without the acceptance of the system itself, France’s perception of its identity as 
the keeper of Syria would simply be a fantasy. However, its own self-identification as well as the 
systemic acceptance of this role allowed France’s power to grow and burgeon in Syria.  
Still, one cannot take the systemic acceptance of France as an authority over its Arab 
neighbors for granted. This acceptance has its own roots in a culture of Orientalism, like the 
British-Iraqi situation in chapter two. The dominant Orientalist notion of the West’s power over 
the East and its rightful role as the civilizer of backward societies gave credence to France’s 
interests in the region. The systemic Orientalist culture thus helped constitute France’s identity 
and its actions in Syria, which pushed forth a religious-sectarian identity on the new state once it 
was formed. 
Thus, we can see that the French mandate period supported creating the first visions of 
sectarian Syria. Within a supportive systemic environment, France possessed the legitimacy it 
needed to pursue its interests in Syria. The fear of nationalists gave France an interest in courting 
religious minorities, who were perceived as more likely allies. This policy created a sense of 
disenfranchisement by the majority who then felt a greater sense of religious identity due to the 
discriminatory policies that enabled certain sects to thrive while others were neglected. By the 
end of the mandate period, the Alawis found themselves in a strategically powerful position that 
would come to shape the remaining modern history of Syria. 
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The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any differences existing among its sons are 
accidental and unimportant. They will disappear with the awakening of the Arab 
consciousness… The national bond will be the only bond existing in the Arab state. It 
ensures harmony among the citizens by melting them in the crucible of a single nation, 
and combats all other forms of factional solidarity such as religious, sectarian, tribal, 
racial and regional factionalism.
147
  
The passage above comes from the Constitution of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and 
puts forth an ideal image of Syria in the mid-twentieth century, less than twenty years after Syria 
officially became the Syrian Republic and escaped French mandate rule.
148
 After gaining 
independence in 1946, Syria experienced several political shifts, including the military coup of 
1946, executed by three Sunni leaders, as well as the short-lived United Arab Republic that 
briefly unified Egypt and Syria. In 1963, the Baath party successfully staged another coup that 
would shape the remaining modern history of Syria prior to the Syrian civil war. 
Due to the centrality of the Baath party in Syria’s modern history, the original 
composition of the party needs to be briefly reviewed.  The party originally recruited members 
from rural migrants that came to Damascus to study.
149
 Founded by Christian Michel Aflaq and 
Sunni Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the two recruited through traditional social channels. 
Aflaq’s personal ties to the Druze region led him to spread the party among that population. The 
party’s socialist ideals appealed to rural students who attended university and joined the party 
then spread its ideology back in their own hometowns. According to an early member of the 
Baath, Sami al-Jundi, “The social conditions in rural areas were favorable to the growth and 
spread of the party. It expanded there and remained weak in the cities…especially in Damascus. 
In the course of time, therefore, it became a big body with a small head.” Since most rural areas 
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were dominated by Arab-speaking religious minorities, the Baath became a reflection of this 
group. 
 At its core, the Baath party didn’t seem to present a sectarian threat to Syria. The Baath – 
or Renaissance – ideology combined European socialism with Arab nationalism.150 The party 
aimed to return to the virtues of the Jahiliyya, the period of time before Islam before the Turks 
and Persians tainted the honorable character and purity of the Arab identity. Its slogan was 
“Unity, Freedom and Socialism.” In a speech in 1957, Aflaq emphasized the centrality of the 
Arab identity in uniting Syrians: 
Our movement sees colonialism more as a result than as a cause, a result of whatever 
defects and distortions adulterate our society… The atmosphere created by previous 
movements… was a false atmosphere which concealed from the people the reality of the 
problem. They did not understand or deem it right that our problem, in all Arab regions, 
was one problem, that the unification of the struggle was necessary, that the separation 
which had been imposed on our land was artificial and obstructive, and that in the hearts 
of the people was a guarantee that the rust would be cleared, that the falseness (of the 
separation) would disappear and that the fact that our nation was one nation would 
become apparent.
151
 
Despite such noble speech, the practical implications of the party’s rise to power led to 
clear sectarian divisions. After the Baathist coup, the new ruling party set up the National 
Council of the Revolutionary Command and immediately purged of Nasserist officers, or 
sympathizers of the United Arab Republic who were mainly Sunnis.
152
 Pro-Nasser newspaper 
editors were imprisoned and non-Baath publications were banned. Predominantly Sunni Kurds 
also faced similar suppression. Kurds weren’t allowed to join the Baath party due to their “un-
                                                          
150 Robert Olson, The Baath and Syria: From the French Mandate to the Era of Hafiz Al-Asad (Princeton: 
The Kingston Press, 1982), 1-5. 
151 Ibid., 9.  
152 Ibid., 9-22. 
67 
 
Arab” character and many were expelled to Turkey, an act justified by claiming that Kurds were 
actually “mountain Turks.” Thousands of Sunni Kurds were stripped of their citizenship and thus 
deemed foreigners even if they possessed valid Syrian IDs. Corrupt elections for the Regional 
Congress in 1963 brought Baathists to all eight seats of the Regional Command. The active 
disenfranchisement of Nasserist, Kurds and other predominantly Sunni groups became 
interpreted as an active attack against Sunnis in Syria. 
Baathist Recruitment & Alawi Domination 
Despite the party opening membership to all Syrians, including non-Arabs, the party’s 
original membership composition determined its future identity. At the time of the coup, the 
party had only secured 600 civilian members among its ranks. Due to this limited size, it took 
major steps to bolster its support base.
153
 The party promoted all current members to “active 
members,” which gave them new rights to nominate members to the party as well as participate 
in party elections. The party more than quintupled within one year as a result of this change. 
“Active membership” was also given more freely to new recruits, regardless of any original 
criteria such as level of education. The party became more and more homogenous, with members 
recruiting those of their religious or tribal background regardless of support for the Baathist 
ideology. An organization report published in 1965 states: “[There is a] presence of personal 
relationships rather than party relationships…The result of all this is that the party is threatened 
by the infiltration into its midst of the disorders of bourgeois, feudal, tribal and sectarian 
realities.”154 
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Five of the fourteen members of the Baathist Military Committee were Alawi, with the 
highest leadership posts in the hands of three Alawi – Muhammad ‘Umran, Salah Jadid and 
Hafiz al-Assad.
155
 Religious minorities made up the majority of party members. The party 
purged Nasserist and Independent Unionist members in the army. This disproportionately 
affected Sunni Muslims, who made up the bulk of Nasserists and Independent Unionists. During 
the Nasserist rebellion in July 18, 1963, the minority-dominated (specifically Alawi dominated) 
army cracked down on dissidents. Anti-Baathist publications started to appear claiming a 
sectarian character of the Syrian Baathist regime. One opposition leader, Muta Safadi, wrote: 
“Dismissals by the hundreds were all aimed at officers originating from the bigger cities, and 
especially the Sunnis.” In 1966, coup-leaders purged Sunni officer factions. According to 
secretary-general of the National Command of the Baath party in 1965 and 1966 Dr. Munif al-
Razzaz:  
The smells of deliberate sectarian bloc formation started to emanate. At first it was 
whispered about, but later the voices became louder, as it appeared that there were real 
indications that the accusations [stating that in their struggle for power, the military had 
exploited sectarian ties in such a way as to have specifically negative results from the 
Sunnis] were well-founded.
156
 
The situation continued to lean in favor of religious minorities with the second-phase of 
the Baath regime in 1966 when Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Assad successfully defeated their rivals 
to take control of the party.
157
 Leading officers were Alawi, Druze and Isma’ili, members of the 
smallest religious groups in Syria. With growing conflict between different party factions, the 
Isma’ilis were eventually eliminated from the party and Assad was able to solidify his hold in the 
1970s. 
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 Sectarian divisions were clearly apparent during the Assad regime. Prior to the Baath 
coup, from 1942 until 1963, Sunnis, urbanites and the upper class held the highest government 
posts, with approximately 95 percent Sunni representation in the Regional Congress during the 
Syrian-Egyptian union.
158
 From 1958 until 1961, no Christians were represented at all in the 
Regional Congress. After 1963, there was a clear shift, with a domination of the main power 
institutions by those from poor rural areas, who predominantly held unorthodox Islamic 
ideologies like the Alawi, Druze and Isma’ili. From 1966 until 1970, major cities like Damascus 
and Aleppo, predominantly Sunni strongholds, remained completely unrepresented in the 
regime’s power structures. Thirty percent of the Regional Congress came from Latakia, a 
predominantly Alawi stronghold, another twenty percent came from Hawran and fifteen percent 
came from Dayr al-Zur. Alawis held the strongest representation at nearly twenty-five percent, a 
group that only made up eleven percent of the Syrian population as a whole. One of the founding 
members of the Baath and the Minister of Information in the cabinet after the Baathist coup, 
Sami al-Jundi, narrated the following: 
Three days after my entering the Ministry, the [party] comrades came to ask me for an 
extensive purge operation… the measure of a minister’s success [was determined by] the 
lists of dismissals, since party members as well as their relatives and the members of their 
tribes [came to] demand their campaign and kinship rights. From the time the party 
appeared on the stage, caravans of villagers started to leave the villages of the plains and 
mountains for Damascus.
159
  
 Despite Assad’s attempts to co-opt the Sunnis in the 1970s by increasing their 
representation among Regional Command members, the divisive nature of the regime had shown 
its true colors. In the late 1970s, several political assassinations targeted mostly Alawis.
160
 An 
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extremist Sunni group took credit for the actions in the newsletter al-Nadhir. In it, the group 
explicitly mentions the sectarian motives behind the attacks.  
The first bullet, however, was the result of long and persistent suffering from oppression 
and terror. The prisons of Syria were packed with [Sunni] Muslim prisoners… The ordeal 
reached its climax, however, when oppression became concentrated against the [Sunni] 
Muslims and against the Islamic religion in particular: mosques were destroyed; religious 
scholars arrested; educational programmes were banned….the country was handed piece 
by piece to the Jews; the [Alawi] sectarian party militia were allowed to take the place of 
the regular armed forces.
161
  
The above shows the powerful constitution of competing Syrian religious identities. The 
newsletter puts the “sectarian party militia” at odds with the “Muslim prisoners.” This clearly 
pitted the Sunnis against the Alawis, who are associated with “the Jews,” a traditional sectarian 
nemesis of Muslims. This kind of discourse attempted to frame Alawis as outside of the Muslim 
tradition. Thus, the biased nature of the Baathist regime and its sectarian attacks against the 
Sunnis gave extremist Sunnis the ammo needed to create a sectarian discourse that pitted the 
Alawis and Sunnis against each other. 
Sectarian occurrences became more frequent in Syria. In June 1979, thirty-two cadets 
from the Syrian military were murdered, led by a Sunni member from within the Baath party.
162
 
Again, the attack was viewed as a direct assault on Alawis, despite the fact that others were 
victims. Reports showed that the commando unit which executed the attack forcefully separated 
Sunni and Alawi cadet officers before carrying out the attack.
163
 The regime blamed the Syrian 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood for the massacre and took measures to retaliate against 
Muslim Brotherhood members. 
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Intermestics Reinforce Sectarian Divides  
In parallel with these domestic occurrences, the international community played its part 
in aggravating tensions. Power and identity politics were at play between Syria and Egypt since 
the fall of the United Arab Republic, as proven by various records from the 1960s.
164
 A series of 
correspondence records from the British Embassy describes discussions about the political 
animosity between the Baathist party and Egyptian President Nasser, as highlighted by a series 
of anti-Baath articles written by the popular Egyptian journalist Mohammed Hassanein Heikal in 
the sixties. More than a decade later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat turned the discourse from 
attacks on the Baathist as a whole to sectarian attacks against the Alawis specifically. In a speech 
in 1979, Sadat fueled sectarianism as he declared, “Let these dirty Alawis speak for it. These are 
people who have lost all life’s meaning.”165 Furthermore, discourse on Radio Cairo, which was 
widely listened to in the Arab world, further fueled sectarianism by attacking the identity of the 
Syrian regime. In Cairo’s al-Akhar newspaper, an editorial narrates the occurrences of the attack 
on the Alawis and the retaliation as follows:  
If news of this massacre came as a surprise to some people and aroused fear and 
consternation, it was no surprise to those who are conversant with the facts of the 
situation in Syria and the atrocities which Alawi Baathist rule is committing against the 
Syrian people. This massacre was only one link in a long chain of crimes and 
assassinations and of other acts of suppression and coercion to which the Alawi Baath 
Party resorts in order to humiliate the Syrian people and to guarantee its own rule. The 
Syrian people were bound to rise against such humiliation and to defend themselves… 
The massacre [of Alawi cadets] took place ten days ago but was kept secret, so that 
henchmen of the Alawi regime could go on a murder rampage among non-Alawis or 
Sunnis. News agencies have said that most of those recently killed were Sunnis and that 
killing in revenge for the massacre of Alawis in Aleppo is continuing. As a result, Syria is 
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in danger of becoming the victim of inter-communal strife and civil war, similar to the 
Lebanese civil war.
166
 
 The Baath party, which was specifically identified by its Alawi nature, is clearly 
juxtaposed with the “Syrian people.” The Alawi are placed as the “other” within Syrian society, 
much like the Sunni extremist discourse within Syria. This can be seen by the way the author of 
the editorial describes how “the Alawi Baath Party” acted “to humiliate the Syrian people.” This 
implies that the Alawis are not a part of the “Syrian people” as the religious group as a whole is 
contrasted with Syrian citizens. This is the same method used by President Sadat when he made 
no differentiation between the leaders of the Baath party and the “dirty Alawis.” Similarly, 
Hussein of Jordan highlighted the Alawi nature of the regime.
167
  
 There was an internal and external battle for the identity of Syria. In 1979, Assad gave a 
speech in which he said “the concept of ‘homeland’ loses its meaning if its citizens are not equal. 
This equality is an integral part of Islam… [I] lead it [Syria]… not in the name of a religion or of 
a religious community, despite the fact that Islam is the religion of the majority.”168 Assad 
claimed that sectarian tensions were the result of “a conspiracy against our country” and blamed 
the Muslim Brotherhood in both his speech and state propaganda. Anti-Brotherhood propaganda 
labeled the group “traitors, renegades and heretics.”  In another speech in the opening of the 
Seventh Syrian Regional Congress session, on December 22, 1979, Assad states “May God curse 
them and their Islam. We shall not have one Islam with them. They are murderers of Islam and 
Muslims. They are traitors of Islam and Muslims.” A deeper systemic and unit-level analysis of 
the construction of the Syrian identity is essential to our understanding of sectarianism. 
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 Systemically, several factors are at play in regards to the battle over the identity of both 
the regime and Syria. The Egyptian and Jordanian attempts to define Assad’s regime by its 
“Alawi” nature is part of a greater battle over the region’s general identity. Tensions between 
Egypt and Syria had grown since the break-up of the union in the sixties.
169
 Not only did the 
Baath regime take control of the country but they also purged the Sunnis in power institutions 
upon ascending to power. This posed a threat to the general Sunni Arab vision of the region, 
even if unity under such an ideal was no longer possible. At the same time as these events were 
happening, the region faced the Shia Islamic threat of the Iranian Revolution. The Alawi-Sunni 
conflict in Syria can thus be situated within a larger battle for the identity of the region as Sunni 
Arab, which explains Jordan and Egypt’s reaction towards the new Syrian regime and their 
strong condemnation of the “Alawi Baath.” 
Domestically, the actions of the regime allowed the growth of sectarian religious 
discourse and sentiment. The regime supported the earlier constitution of sectarian divisions 
inherited from the French by allowing sectarianism to flourish within its ranks. The purging of 
Sunnis from power structures and the deliberate attacks on Sunnis allowed for sectarian religious 
identities to become more salient. Further aggravating these sentiments was the Alawi and 
minority domination of power structures despite their small representation among the Syrian 
population as a whole. While Assad may have brought forth a unified Arab image from his 
discourse upon his ascent to power, his actions conveyed a different message altogether. The 
concerns about the minority-status of most of the members of the Baath leadership and power 
structures fueled Baathist interest in eliminating the ideological threat that the party believed the 
Sunnis posed. Therefore, this idea of the importance of the religious identity of leaders created 
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sectarian interests that led to actions which further fueled sectarian sentiments within the country 
and abroad, within the systemic environment previously analyzed. 
The Hama Massacre & Its Sectarian Legacy 
The situation reached its peak with the Hama Massacre. An attempted assassination of 
Hafiz al-Assad in 1980 led the regime to execute several attacks against the Brotherhood, and 
more generally Sunnis.
170
 Two units led by President Assad’s brother Rif’at were ordered to kill 
all Muslim Brotherhood members who were held in the Palmyra prison. The operation led to the 
death of 550 Muslim Brotherhood prisoners who were gunned down while trapped in their prison 
cells. The bloodiest attacks came nearly two years later in February in the city of Hama, a 
predominantly Sunni city. The showdown between the Alawi Baath units and the Brotherhood 
escalated to unprecedented levels of violence, killing anywhere from an estimated 5000 to 25000 
victims.
171
 Nearly ten percent of the city’s population was decimated. What matters for this 
thesis is not the details of who the victims were but the perception at the time and afterwards of 
whether or not the regime-led attacks were sectarian in nature.  
Looking at newspaper reports from the time of the massacre can shed light on the 
discourse around the attacks. Due to Assad’s extreme censorship, it is difficult to find 
information about the events, even in terms of literary works.
172
 I will thus rely partially on 
reporting from outside of Syria. An editorial in the Guardian on February 24 narrates a dark 
image of the events that transpired: 
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There has been little eye-witness stuff from the city of Hama, but the reports of escaping 
travelers and the Intelligence assessments of Western embassies combine to provide a 
picture of merciless carnage carried out by the Government’s private Alawite security 
force in which certainly hundreds, probably thousands, have been killed and in which 
parts of the city have been reduced to rubble.
173
 
The massacre is associated primarily with the Assad regime but is still identified with the 
Alawi community due to the make-up of the security forces who executed the orders, which are 
described as part of the “Government’s private Alawite security force.” A year after the 
massacre, Guardian reporter David Hirst interviewed Hama citizens about the destruction of the 
city's mosques, a telling sign that the regime targeted not only the people of Hama but their faith. 
In the article, one Hama resident recalled the following: “when President Assad first came here 
in 1971, the people slaughtered sheep and camels in his honor.”174 He, as well as others, felt 
disillusioned by what had transpired.  
In contemporary Syrian literature, there is little in regards to the Hama massacre, though 
there is plenty of information about other occurrences, such as conflicts with the Turks and the 
British. In one authors’ literary analysis, this “silence on Hama is notable, given the sophisticated 
levels of political consciousness present among Syrian writers.”175 This is partially explained as a 
result of state patronage to writers, who thus relied on the state for their livelihoods and could not 
freely criticize state affairs. However, the analysis points to several literary works which 
indirectly refer to the incident. In a poem referenced at the beginning of this chapter, prolific 
Syrian writer Nizar Kabbani writes: 
a citizen afraid to pray –  
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What if the State Police stake out the prayer line?  
They might say I tried to contact the Merciful on High  
Worse, they might accuse me  
of perpetrating faith  
- God, what a place
176
 
The author alludes to the reality and fear of certain groups in Syria, as a result of the 
Hama rebellion. Given the sectarian nature of the attacks executed by the regime and the overall 
sectarian policies enacted by the Baath, it is logical to conclude that this fear was most strongly 
felt by Sunnis who had the greatest reason to fear the regime and its repressive nature. In a 
memoir written during the Syrian civil war, one woman described the sentiment around political 
repression after the crackdown on the Brotherhood in Hama nearly three decades prior to the 
civil war: “We used to call Syria the ‘Kingdom of Silence’ and it deserved the name. The 1980s 
were full of pain, a decade that saw the most widespread campaign of political oppression.”177  
Part of the legacy of Hafiz would be the massacre in Hama, but could the tide turn? After 
Hafiz’s death, there seemed to be hope that perhaps Syria had entered a new era. Bashar 
represented new hope, with his Western education and anti-corruption stance. Would he overturn 
decades of inherited sectarian strife or would he continue to fuel the flame?  
 
An Inconsistent Leader: the Bashar al-Assad Regime Plays with Sectarian Fire   
Today and tomorrow we are in desperate need to creative minds in order to push the 
development process forward…We are also in desperate need to constructive criticism 
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which is the exact opposite of destructive criticism that often colors most discussions and 
proposals for various reasons whether they are personal or otherwise.
178
 
 After his father’s death, Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power initially brought a welcome ray 
of hope for Syrians. The young Assad took control of a Syria that was largely isolated from the 
rest of the world, with no internet access and a ban on satellite TV.
179
 Bashar gave way for the 
legalization of satellite TV and brought improvements in technology by supporting the growth of 
mobile phone networks and the internet. Bashar’s cosmopolitan Sunni wife Asma also brought a 
welcome indication that perhaps the new regime wouldn’t be marred by the old sectarian 
leniencies. It appeared that Syria might have a new progressive leader that could perhaps bring 
forward a new political agenda that might bring prosperity to the people and support national 
unity.  
The so-called “Damascus Spring” further supported the new hopes for Syria. During the 
Damascus Spring in 2001, the regime implemented more liberal policies and political opposition 
briefly thrived. The short Damascus Spring led the way for the burgeoning of political groups 
and even witnessed the release of hundreds of political prisoners.
180
  Civil society seemed to 
suddenly flourish, with a number of debating clubs forming during that time. The Civil Society 
Movement was one of the many groups that briefly experienced this moment of hope. As a 
secular network of intellectuals, journalists, actors, doctors, professors and other professionals, 
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the group sought to slowly transition Syria into a more progressive state by pursuing incremental 
changes and avoiding violent methods.
181
  
During the Damascus Spring, Syrian opposition groups and people of all ideologies 
joined forces to write the “Manifesto of 99,” which presented a number of the desires and 
demands of the people, mostly related to increasing freedoms.
182
 The “Manifesto of the 1000” 
soon followed but presented more threatening demands, including political party plurality.  
The new freedoms came as fast as they disappeared, only a year after it began. Debating 
clubs that formed were soon banned and Syria’s prisons filled back up with opposition members. 
According to philosopher and Civil Society Movement member Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, “His 
[Bashar’s] original sin was not to offer national reconciliation. Many even said that he would be 
ready to reconcile with Israel but not with his own people.”183 
Assad reshuffled the administration continuously throughout his years in power. In the 
first two years alone, he replaced more than 75 percent of the leading officials in politics, 
including in the military and administration.
184
 In place of the former heads, technocrats were 
placed in key positions. Top officials seemed to have relatively clean records. However, while 
Assad promised to limit Baathist power and confine the party to the ideological domain, his 
promises went unfulfilled. Baathist members in his new cabinet were in eighteen of the positions, 
as opposed to the former fifteen members under his father.
185
 By 2004, the regime began to take 
steps to consolidate Bashar’s power by purging those opposed to the new president. There were 
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more Alawis in power during Bashar’s time than during the reign of his father.186 Bashar 
dismissed two of the regime’s oldest Sunni loyalists, Khaddam and Tlass, in favor of members of 
his extended family, who were Alawis.
187
 And as author Carsten Wieland wrote, during 2011 
“with rising stakes in the conflict and increasing brutality it was above all Alawis (and to a lesser 
extent Christians, Druze and Ismailis) who were exposed to existential fear of retaliation, 
although some Alawi figures counted among important representatives of the opposition.” For 
our purposes, it is perhaps not so important if the Alawis were all supportive of Bashar or not, 
but that there was a sentiment among the people that Alawis were the people of Bashar and were 
his supporters based on their religious ties.  
Bashar’s regime would continue to be marred by inconsistent statements and policies 
until the 2011 revolution. The regime oscillated between moving towards and against certain 
oppositional groups. The following sections will aim to assess the regime’s relations with the 
secularists, Islamists, moderates and Christians. These assessments will allow for a more 
thorough understanding of the construction of sectarianism in Syria today. 
Silencing Secularist Visions of Reconciliation 
Bashar’s regime had an inconsistent relationship with secularists in society, despite the 
Baath’s professed secular nature. After the war in Iraq, the government seemed to attempt to 
ameliorate its relation with secularists by voicing approval of the opposition.
188
 In May 2004, the 
Lebanese newspaper al-Safir, Bahjat Suleiman, a powerful leader of the Syrian intelligence 
service, wrote, “In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but ‘opponents’ whose demands do 
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not go beyond certain political and economic reforms such as the end of the state of emergency.” 
The commentary seemed to praise the secular opposition’s aims and framed the opposition as 
critical but not adversaries.   
Michel Kilo, a leader of the Civil Society Movement, was allowed for the first time to 
publish a piece critical of the regime in March 2004.
189
 He was even allowed to speak on Syrian 
television, also for the first time. During the interview, Kilo referred to the 1963 Baathist coup 
when he said “Syria needs a different beginning than that of March 8.” 
Many of the occurrences in the following period show that the Syrian people began to re-
constitute themselves along a more unified front, which disregarded the barriers of sectarian 
identities. New alliances were formed in 2005 when twelve unlicensed parties and groups created 
a committee for the “national coordination of the defense of basic and human rights.” The group 
included Kurdish activists, Civil Society Movement members and communists.
190
 Oppositional 
groups abroad also joined forces and gathered in Brussels in June 2004. Kilo explained the 
regime’s sudden leniency as follows: “Because of it [oppositional activities abroad] our voice 
has become much louder and bolder. The regime will have to give us more leeway since they’re 
afraid we’ll join up with supporters abroad. We have threatened to do so. We have to become 
even more aggressive.” 
More steps were taken by the people towards what seemed to be national reconciliation. 
The Damascus Declaration of 16 October 2005 unified even more groups, including the secular 
Civil Society Movement, the Kurds, moderate Muslims and the banned Muslim Brotherhood that 
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was now based out in London. The Declaration was a broad appeal for democratic change that 
would shun “totalitarian thought” and sever “all plans for exclusion.”191  It called for:  
[a] new social contract… [with a] modern democratic constitution that makes citizenship 
the criterion of affiliation, and adopts pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and the 
rule of law in a state all of whose citizens enjoy the same rights and have the same duties, 
regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, sect, or clan and prevents the return of tyranny in 
new forms.  
It further adopted an inclusive appeal to the Muslim Brothers and other Islamic affiliates 
by proclaiming that “Islam – which is the religion and ideology of the majority, with its lofty 
intentions, higher values, and tolerant canon law – is the most prominent cultural component in 
the life of the nation and the people.”192 The document was very explicit in its mention of 
religion and its aim for unification and equality. To emphasize this point further, it states that the 
new society should be “free of fanaticism, violence and exclusion, while having great concern 
for the respect of the beliefs, culture, and special characteristics of others, whatever their 
religious, confessional and intellectual affiliations and openness to new and contemporary 
cultures.” 
This declaration is intriguing analytically for a variety of reasons. First, its explicit 
mention of the need to shun “totalitarian thought” and adopt pluralism validates our previous 
analysis about the exclusivity in Syrian politics. The sectarian nature of that exclusivity is also 
shown by the frequent mention of religion and the need for equal rights and power distribution 
that would apply “regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, sect, or clan.” The other interesting 
component of this declaration is the attempt to constitute a new identity, one that could perhaps 
use Islam as a cultural identity to unify the people, unlike Hafiz al-Assad who had used Arabism 
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as the unifying commonality amongst Syrians. The various groups involved in this declaration 
are thus not passively accepting the rule of the state and its outcomes, but are actively seeking to 
create a new identity for Syrians that would unify them in a new and more equal society. 
The group went beyond simple words and formed the National Council for Democratic 
Change in January 2007.
193
 Alawis, Christians and Sunnis once again joined forces to actualize 
their interests. More than 150 people came to the first meeting, which lasted for more than 
twelve hours. The group was a mix of females and males, with its president a female doctor 
named Fida al-Howrani and included a variety of ideologically and politically diverse members. 
Secularists and moderate Islamists were working together to formulate a new platform to 
modernize Syria. This diverse group shows that the opposition against the regime refused to 
constitute Syrian identity along sectarian lines. Instead of allowing the regime to define Syria 
alone, the group aimed to reconstitute the Syrian identity along unifying principles.  
However, the hope that came from the spirited words of the Declaration and the 
aspirations of those who had been able to overcome numerous obstacles to form a unified front 
were quickly extinguished by another crackdown by the regime. Within a month of the initial 
meeting, the main leaders of the group were arrested.
194
 Riad Seif, an independent 
parliamentarian and entrepreneur who participated in writing the Declaration, was the last of 
twelve leaders of the group to be arrested in 2007. The regime enforced travel bans and strict 
surveillance on those suspected of membership in this or other oppositional groups. In 2010, the 
regime canceled a secular conference organized at the University of Damascus.
195
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By 2010, the opposition seemed to have lost the hope that it once felt at the beginning of 
the new millennium. According to Michel Kilo, “The political opposition are at loggerheads with 
one another. They jointly signed the Damascus Declaration, and now one suspects the other of 
being an American agent.”196 When talking of the Civil Society Movement, Kilo remained proud 
of the work done, “we were the driving force, not the political parties… The intellectuals 
delivered the proof that the Syrian street was not dead, and that the middle class was vibrant and 
full of ideas. But the intellectuals who moved things became the main targets of the regime.” 
According to Seif, the unified message of the Declaration and its member groups was one that 
appealed to a diverse array of Syrians. “If people were not afraid of punishment, the support 
would be unlimited… We are liberals, nationalists, Islamists, Kurds, Arabs, communists, etc. We 
are a team that represents Syria as it is. Our commonness was democracy.” 
Increasing Religious Discourse & Encouraging Radical Islam  
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s history in Syria prior to the Bashar regime was marred by the 
history of the Hama massacre. From the 1980s, membership in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
organization was not only prohibited but punishable by death. The regime exiled leaders of the 
movement to London.
197
 The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, however, was unique among its 
neighboring affiliated groups due to its relations with non-Islamist opposition movements. In 
fact, there was regular contact between the secular Civil Society Movement and the Brotherhood. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a participating agent in the active 
attempts to form a national coalition opposition. The focus of the Syrian Muslim Brothers on 
democracy, freedom of speech and other popular issues allowed them to easily collaborate with 
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other opposition groups. According to Kilo, a Christian and a leader of the Civil Society 
Movement: 
I believe they [the Muslim Brotherhood] are a moderate force with a strong democratic 
tendency… Therefore we won’t give the regime the chance to play us off against each 
other… If my opinion is the expression of a civil and secular democracy and theirs is an 
Islamic one, this is all right as long as we have democracy as a common denominator. We 
will accept the Muslims coming to power through elections, provided that they accept the 
democratic system… We have no problems with Islamic groups and organizations. I 
mean when the Islamists become democrats, they won’t frighten us anymore. 
Despite the cooperation between the secularists and the Muslim Brothers, the 
Brotherhood’s relationship with the Bashar regime was more favorable than the secularists. In 
2004, the regime began to reach out to the group, perhaps in an attempt for reconciliation.
198
 
While the regime continued to refuse to apologize for what happened in Hama, it did extend an 
olive branch. In April, Bashar met with leading Islamists from the region, Islamists with direct 
connections to the Syrian branch. Later, he also directly contacted the Muslim Brothers, which 
was more of a sign of friendship than the regime had shown to secularist groups. The idea of 
getting rid of the death penalty as a punishment for membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was 
brought up by a parliamentary member. An even more telling sign of the regime’s changed 
attitude came with the arrest of Nabil Fayyad, an intellectual who had written critically of the 
growing influence of radical Islamists. The regime seemed to be siding with the Islamists over 
their secular counterparts. The Hama massacre was even deemed a “tragic event” by Imad 
Mustafa, a Syrian Ambassador to the US. Former members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had 
been exiled were allowed to return upon apologizing for what happened in Hama. According to 
philosopher Tayyeb Tizini, “The regime has sometimes actively supported the Islamists because 
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they wanted to keep them as a visible danger to the secular opposition: ‘Just look, this is the 
danger. Either you have us or you get them.’”199 
Unlike secularists that had no safe space to meet due to the regime’s policies, the Muslim 
Brothers and Islamists in general had countless safe havens including Quranic schools and 
mosques.
200
 While meetings of more than five people were banned in regular public spaces due 
to active martial law, the policy didn’t apply to religious institutions which had no surveillance. 
According to Saleh, the meeting ban “applies to us in the Civil Society Movement… But nobody 
forbids people to go to the mosques in crowds and assemble for talks.” And according to 
political scientist Salam Kawkibi in an interview in 2004, “The regime is now doing all it can to 
survive. This includes approaching the Muslim Brothers. It is trying to curry favor with everyone 
except the secular Civil Society Movement… Nowadays there are hundreds of mosques in 
Damascus but not a single meeting hall for secular people. This says everything.”  
 There was a sense that moderate Islam was being stifled while radical variants were left 
to flourish. In 2010, two moderate Islamic centers were shut down.
201
 According to Sheikh 
Muhammad al-Habash, former director of one of the centers that was closed, “The Ministry is 
very intolerant. They want to convert everyone to conservative Islam and we as imams should be 
instruments for this.” Another indication of the increasingly conservative rhetoric of the Islam 
supported by the regime was revealed in 2009 during the drafting of a new Personal Status 
Law.
202
 Sunni Islamists dominated the panel chosen for the task. An outcry from moderates soon 
followed as a result of the strict interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence used in the new 
                                                          
199 Ibid., 164. 
200 Ibid., 165. 
201 Ibid., 174. 
202 Ibid., 177. 
86 
 
document. The new law would strengthen male rights at the expense of women and minority 
rights were weakened. Restrictions were placed on Christian and other minority clergy, who 
would have to rely on the state for their own internal religious affairs. The outrage peaked with 
an online campaign against the change in parallel with online advocacy and lobbying to dismiss 
the new law. Revisions to the draft produced in 2009 did nothing to ameliorate the opposition 
that feared the conservative rhetoric within the law, and continued protests eventually led the 
regime to dismiss the matter.   
Furthermore, the regime’s opposition to the US was bolstered by the Islamists, who 
already held anti-American stance. Bashar allowed for the transit of Sunni jihadists from his 
borders into Iraq.
203
 This support of jihadist activities in the neighboring country no doubt had 
repercussions internally. Assad consistently deemed Iraqi rebels a “legitimate resistance.”204  
Despite these conservative leniencies, by 2010, the tide seemed to turn once again with a 
number of measures against Islamists.
205
 Prayer rooms were shut down in popular restaurants 
along with public prayer rooms during Ramadan. The niqab was banned in schools for both 
teachers and girls, and curriculum in schools became more secular. 
Further adding to the resentment of Sunnis was the economic situation.
206
 Bashar’s 
regime had cut subsidies for ordinary citizens and this, along with the drought that was 
experienced in Syria from 2006 until 2010, led to the further disenfranchisement and 
impoverishment of mostly Sunni peasants who were hit the worst. The Sunni peasants who had 
been on the side of Hafiz were now even more frustrated with his son. According to interviews, 
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there was some resentment between religious groups as a result of the perceived empowerment 
of Alawi migrants over other peasants. Thus, the regime fueled sectarianism by allowing 
religiosity to grow at the expense of secularists, while at the same time adding to the grievances 
of Sunnis due to the regime’s inconsistent policies.  
Flourishing Christian Society & Muslim-Christian Relations 
The bulk of research in the area of Syria focuses predominantly on the Alawis and 
Sunnis, given that one has been in power for the last several decades and the other is part of the 
majority. The role of Christians in comprehensive works on Syria is often in passing, but is 
central to our understanding of sectarian construction. This short section aims to give a glimpse 
into the role of Christians during Bashar’s regime and the role they played in constructing some 
form of national unity.  
During Bashar’s regime, Christians raised concerns about the growing conservative 
Sunni movement, like their secular and moderate Muslim counterparts, but they generally 
seemed to enjoy good relations with the regime.
207
 Christians in Syria held equal rights in the 
law, except for the stipulation in the constitution that the president must be Muslim. Christian 
churches flourished in Syria and even enjoyed state support, with exemptions from taxes like 
mosques. The degree to which Syria was a sanctuary for Christians is shown by the large number 
of Iraqi Christian refugees that flooded the country after the American invasion of Iraq. In the 
summer months of 2004, more than a quarter of a million Christians were reported to have fled 
from Iraq into Syria for refuge. By 2005, there were more than 700,000 refugees of all faiths in 
Syria. Seventy percent of refugees in Syria in 2010 had been in Syria for more than four years, 
which can either be an indication of refugees’ lack of an alternative choice or as a sign of the 
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relative liberties enjoyed by refugees in Syria. In general, the literature seems to indicate the 
latter.  
The literature also indicates that Christians received ample support during Bashar and 
Hafiz’s respective regimes. One study of Christian charities actually posits that Christians had a 
better relationship with the regime than their Sunni counterparts since they weren’t viewed as a 
political threat.
208
 The regime allowed Christian charities to flourish under its patronage. The 
Christians played equal part in the relationship, reinforcing the regime’s secular and pluralistic 
image. There is also ample proof of the peaceful coexistence of Muslim and Christian groups, as 
was indicated by the earlier statements by Michel Kilo. The Christian charities study in the 
previously mentioned research found that Christian charities were inclusive in regards to their 
beneficiaries. At one charity, Terre des Hommes Syrie, for example, Muslims made up more 
than 95 percent of its beneficiaries in 2008. Muslims also participated on the charity’s board of 
directors. 
The increased presence of religious institutions and symbols, however, is important in our 
understanding of sectarianism. Increased presence of religiously-based entities and symbols, 
especially those of extremist fanatics, meant a general increased salience of sectarian religious 
identities. Syrians increasingly began seeing religious figures in media discussion and tensions 
led to a presidential decree to regulate Muslim religious movements in 2008.
209
 As one 
intellectual, Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, explained it: “There is a kind of competition to demonstrate 
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more clearly one’s religious identity. The Muslims are building more mosques; the Christians 
organize more lavish procession and hang bigger crosses round their necks.”210 
Syrian Civil War: A Sectarian Conflict? 
As has been seen, Bashar’s regime was inconsistent throughout his ten years in power. 
Some have noted that this is due to the fact that it was no longer a one man show, with 
conflicting interests between Bashar and the old regime stalwarts.
211
 Regardless of the reason, 
instead of supporting a unified front, such as the one presented by the signatories of the 
Declaration, the regime seemed to give mixed signals to secularists and toyed with Islamists.  
In part, Bashar’s fears of the opposition in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s may 
have also been due to fears of the ongoing war in Iraq. Potential interventions n Syria seemed 
like a real possibility at the time. Therefore, systemic factors affected internal affairs by creating 
an environment of fear over the potential overturning of the status quo by supporting any form of 
opposition. “We don’t want to turn into a second Iraq” was a popular sentiment even amongst 
people.
212
 
Bashar thus played with fire while he allowed the threat of the Islamists to dangle in front 
of the people and the moderate opposition. The regime allowed conservative Islamists to flourish 
to a certain degree in order to show that the regime was better than an alternative. The fact that 
the regime allowed this shows that there seemed to be a confidence that such radical 
conservativism would not be a popular idea among citizens, which does seem to be the case 
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according to our earlier analysis. However, when Islamist power seemed to grow and pose a 
threat, the regime once again cracked down on dissidents. 
What occurred is problematic in several ways. First, the Bashar regime didn’t form a 
consistent message nor did it foster the growth of a particular national identity. While espousing 
secularist discourse like the old regime, the regime never took action to support secularists. 
Secularists were being attacked while the Islamists flourished. However, it is my analysis that to 
a large degree the sentiment of Syrian sectarianism was limited only to a few groups. Unlike the 
Iraqi case, there was little evidence in the literature that the people themselves felt bitterness 
towards one another on the basis of faith. For the most part, Syrians seemed willing and able to 
create diverse opposition groups that showed that Syrian society was not completely marred by 
sectarian tendencies despite the fact that the Bashar regime supported policies that could very 
easily espouse such sentiments. 
However, it is very possible that with the start of the civil war, Bashar’s conspiratorial 
and sectarian discourse brought greater salience to sectarian sentiments that had been growing 
beneath the surface for decades. The regime fed into sectarian interpretations of the conflict by 
acting upon the notion that the issue was sectarian. After the initial protests, the regime 
immediately began to make concessions to Sunni Islamists through a number of actions.
213
 In 
April 2011, the regime lifted the ban on the niqab for teachers and students that had been in place 
for about a year. That same month, Sheikh Ramadan al-Bouti indicated that the regime would 
allow for the establishment of a religious TV channel, which had previously been demanded by 
Sunnis. Islamist political prisoners were set free and a casino was shut down. All indications 
point to an attempt by the regime to reconcile with its Islamist opponents. Further concessions 
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were made to the Syrian Sunni Kurds, who were finally granted citizenship after decades of 
denial. When reconciliation failed, the regime changed its tone. During the civil war, the 
government took measures to cleanse all non-Alawis from its ranks, especially Sunni civil 
servants.
214
 Syria would very soon become a hub for a wider radical Islamic movement that 
found its enemy in both the rule of autocrats in the region as well as against the West. 
The Syrian landscape was complex in 2011 at the start of the civil war. Valiant attempts 
had been made by diverse political and civil groups to present their own national vision of Syria 
throughout the early 2000s. Their sense of unity was continuously crushed by Bashar throughout 
his decade in power. Assad’s regime seemed to support Islamists and radicals over their 
secularist counterparts, which bolstered resentments between groups.  
 
Conclusion 
Since the days of the mandate, we have seen a push for a unified Syrian identity by the 
people while another force from above, both domestically and internationally, attacked this 
vision. The literature seems to indicate that there was a sense of unity among opposition groups. 
By the twenty-first century, both moderate Islamists and secularists agreed on the danger posed 
by radical Islamists and presented a unified vision of Syrian society. These diverse oppositional 
groups successfully formed a platform for their vision through in 2007 with the formation of the 
National Council for Democratic Change.
215
 However, due to the Assad regime’s paranoid fears 
of all forms of opposition, the group disbanded and many of its leaders were put in jail. Both 
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Bashar and Hafiz attempted to put forth a unifying vision of Syria through their discourse but 
their actions failed to convert that vision into reality.   
Was there a sectarian sentiment in Syria? It seems that the construct of the sectarian 
nature of the country was more a result of consistent propaganda internally, especially after the 
war broke out, as well as externally by the Western media’s focus on sectarian divisions.216 
Oversimplified images of the war were consistently projected, which presented the groups by 
single ethno-sectarian agendas. According to Phillips, part of the problem was the confusion of 
regional wars which may have led to an “Iraq contagion,” whereby the Syrian conflict was 
viewed through the same lens as its neighbor. At the same time, Syrian discourse in the region 
also served to perpetuate sectarian anger. On a regular slot on a Saudi TV channel, the Syrian 
Sheikh Adnan al-Arour continued to feed anger towards the Alawis.
217
 Similarly, Qatari-owned 
Al-Jazeera further fueled the flame. In a 2013 newscast, al-Qaradawi stated, “The leader of the 
party of Satan [Hezbollah] comes to fight the Sunnis...Now we know what the Iranians 
want…continued massacres to kill Sunnis.” This kind of discourse further constituted the Syrian 
conflict along sectarian divides, and thus also re-constituted the Syrian identity itself along these 
same lines by defining the people by their Alawi or Sunni identity. 
Systemically, it is now apparent that regional conflicts have found their battlefield in 
Syria. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have all supported various Islamist groups in Syria, 
groups which have very clearly espoused sectarian sentiments.
218
 In 2013, Saudi Arabia 
approved the formation of the Salafist Islamic Front, which used anti-Alawi discourse openly. 
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Regular citizens in the region and around the world were able to funnel funds to different groups 
and people would soon come from around the world to fight in Syria. 
Nihad Nahas, a Sunni communist among the regime’s opposition who spent 15 years in 
prison, said “Syrian society used to be much more liberal and more secular. It was not until after 
the Alawis strong-armed Assad to power that tribes and religious groups gained importance. The 
ideological rift between them has deepened.”219 This sentiment is supported by others, including 
a Syrian intellectual who summed it up with the following: “In the 1950s we were communists, 
Baathists, Nasserists, or Syrian nationalists. Today we are Sunnis, Alawis, Druze, or Christians 
again.” The days of a unified front in Syria were gone. 
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Chapter 4 – Patterns in Constructing Sectarianism 
Introduction  
As has been seen, sectarianism requires a nurturing environment in order to burgeon and 
grow in societies. This thesis attempted to show that sectarianism is not innate in the peoples or 
states of Syria and Iraq, nor is it simply innate in Islamic societies. Instead, sectarianism is 
constructed through intermestic interactions within the international system, reinforced by the 
ideas and interests of agent states. The burgeoning of sectarian violence in the two states must 
thus be understood with a nuanced approach that assesses how historic and modern interactions 
within and between states has impacted the sectarian characteristics of Iraq and Syria.  
The previous chapters have provided a Constructivist analysis of the growth of 
sectarianism in Iraq and Syria from the period of the League of Nations mandates until the 
twenty-first century. The influence of intermestics through system and agent analyses has been 
assessed to form a comprehensive understanding of today’s sectarian conflicts in the two states. 
As case studies, these analyses demonstrate the individual circumstances of the states and how 
sectarianism formed in each. Through a synthetic analysis, we can better understand patterns that 
may allow for a more thorough understanding of the dangers that sectarianism poses to similar 
states. What can we derive from the two cases? What patterns can be identified from the 
previous analyses that can bring clarity to the complexity of today’s sectarian civil wars? 
This chapter will aim to tease out key patterns of sectarian construction that appear within 
both the Syrian and Iraqi cases within this thesis. Each case’s unique elements have already been 
extensively assessed through the case-study chapters. However, in order to truly understand the 
prevalent confusion of our current time, we need to better understand the patterns that have 
allowed sectarianism to flourish. Through Wendt’s Constructivist agenda, which has already 
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been expanded upon in the first chapter, this concluding chapter will highlight and analyze 
several of the key systemic and unit-level interactions that helped construct the sectarian tensions 
that exploded into the  civil wars in Syria and Iraq.  
 
Structural Elements of Sectarian Construction 
The structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, 
interests, and ideas… [They are] distinct and play different roles in explanation. The 
significance of material conditions is constituted in part by interest, but they are not the 
same thing…. Similarly, interests are constituted in part by ideas, but they are not the 
same thing… without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no 
meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all…. 
The task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system 
fit together into some kind of whole.”220 
 The synthesis analysis begins by examining the systemic elements that have shaped 
sectarianism in Syria and Iraq, beginning with the mandate period which was an area of focus for 
both case studies. Wendt gives us the key to understanding the systemic component. We must 
assess three elements: the material conditions, interests and ideas. The interaction between these 
creates the system as a whole. We thus begin with the base of the interests and material 
conditions – ideas. 
Orientalist Foundations of Sectarianism 
 Western rule over Syria and Iraq in the early twentieth century has had irreversible 
consequences on the region, especially in shaping sectarian conflicts. President Woodrow 
Wilson brought forth the Westphalian system of states upon non-European peoples in the 
nineteen twenties.
221
 The new order would be based on “universal” principles of the sovereign 
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state which would aim to foster open world markets and politically independent states. However, 
independence did not come simply through the empowerment of the peoples. Mandates were 
created under the authority of various Western powers which would rule over Oriental lands. As 
we have seen, the power of the mandates built sectarian foundations in the societies of both Syria 
and Iraq.  
What allowed for the rule of Western powers in the two states? Materially, the League of 
Nations was the institution that legitimized the mandates of Iraq and Syria under the British and 
French respectively. However, this material condition cannot exist without both interests and 
ideas, as was elaborated on by Wendt. I argue that the powerful systemic culture of Orientalism 
allowed for the legitimization of the rule of the French and British on Syrian and Iraqi society.  
What were the ideas behind the mandates? In 1907, Gertrude Bell wrote “The Oriental is 
like a very old child… He is not practical in our acceptance of the word, any more than a child is 
practical, and his utility is not ours.”222 Later, she also wrote that “Arabs are too fickle, weak and 
uncivilized.” In an article in The Baghdad Times announcing the new mandate in Iraq – or 
Mesopotamia as it was then called – on May 3, 1920, a similar sentiment is prevalent: 
It is the duty of the mandate power to act the part of a wise and far-seeing guardian who 
makes provision for the training of his charge with a view to fitting him to take his place 
in the world of men. Mesopotamia has suffered under centuries of misrule during which 
the versatility of her people and the productivity of her lands have been checked, or 
stayed... And as the guardian rejoices over the growth of his ward into sane and 
independent manhood, so will the guardian, Power [sic] see with satisfaction the 
development of political institutions which shall be sound and free.
223
 
The above shows several of the key elements that influenced British and French thinking 
during the mandate period. The article notes that the peoples have “suffered under centuries of 
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misrule during which the versatility of her [Mesopotamia’s] people and the productivity of her 
lands have been checked, or stayed.” This powerful notion of the static nature of Ottoman rule 
impacted the way in which the French and British saw their mandates. The British assumed that 
those educated under the Ottomans were backward and not capable of possessing power and thus 
placed their hopes on the authority and rule of tribal sheikhs. The French, believing the millet 
system of the Ottomans to have sustained the complete separation of different religious groups, 
implemented policies that actually aggravated divisions between different religious groups by 
viewing them as completely detached from one another.  
This type of discourse can be juxtaposed with the critical sentiments of the peoples, 
which refuted this notion. In a speech by the Acting Civil Commissioner to Arab Deputation in 
Baghdad in June of 1920, the Commissioner gave an empowered proclamation that dismantled 
Orientalist claims. The Orient was not what the British envisioned and he called for the people to 
stand up, noting demonstrations across the region, including in Syria.  
Lloyd George declared to the House of Commons that Mesopotamia should have a Wasi 
(mandatory) to have charge of the country for its progress etc. but do you know what is 
meant by a mandate? They are unable to look after themselves or to behave themselves. 
Did Lloyd George forget that under Turkish rule, Turkey was a Government which 
depended on Arab officials who were the means of its success… Mesopotamians get up; 
demand your rights, demand your complete independence, confirm the demands of your 
representatives; Wake up from your sleep; the result of sleep will be disastrous.
224
 
Opposing the Western perspective, here we get a different interpretation of Ottoman rule. 
The Commissioner specifically notes that “Turkey was a Government which depended on Arab 
officials who were the means of success.” The speech thus contradicts the notion of the 
backward, static Orient which had not seen progress during the era of the Ottoman Empire. It 
also dismantles the notion that the Orient needs a guardian to take care of it. 
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Even when states gained independence, Orientalist discourse and thought continued. In a 
testimony by the High Commissioner Sir Francis Humphry to argue for the independence of 
Iraq, he argues that there are two types of states, the “civilized nations of the modern world” and 
others like Iraq that “may not run quite so smoothly or so efficiently as in some more advanced 
and highly developed State.”225 In line with Orientalist tradition, the Commissioner views 
Western powers as civilized while Iraq, and other former Ottoman territories, are contrasted with 
this vision and viewed as inefficient and implicitly uncivilized.  
These powerful notions of the child-like Orient, the uncivilized Arab, led to the 
demarcation of various Arab and Oriental lands to Western powers. The League of Nations was 
the platform through which Orientalist ideas were implemented and set forth. Since Arabs were 
“uncivilized,” they needed the support and guidance of the British and the French. It was the 
manifestation of what was known as the “White Man’s Burden” from a famous British poem by 
Rudyard Kipling: 
Take up the White Man's burden-- 
Send forth the best ye breed-- 
Go bind your sons to exile 
To serve your captives' need
226
 
 The powerful imagery, written in 1899, was just as influential during the mandate period 
and afterwards. “Serve your captives’ need” rings with the same sentiment as Bell in her essay 
about the “The Oriental” which is “like a very old child.”227 It is also the same notion as The 
Baghdad Times article which calls for the guardianship of the Orient. 
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 The outcome of these powerful Orientalist ideas during the mandate period of both Iraq 
and Syria, by the British and French, led to the creation of policies based on such Orientalist 
thought. Believing in the Ottoman Empire’s backwardness, the British formed an entirely new 
system based on tribal and religious affiliations.
228
 The French mandate in Syria similarly 
focused on religious divisions to organize society and strengthened the former Ottoman Empire 
millet system, which had evolved over the years by decreasing legal distinctions between 
different religious millets.
229
 The French thus built a system based on religious sects that allowed 
religious minorities to prosper at the expense of the predominantly Sunni Muslim population.  
 This kind of discourse is not simply reserved for the early twentieth century; Orientalist 
discourse has continued to play a key role in the constitution of the East by the West. When 
declaring the invasion of Iraq in 2003, former President George Bush addressed the people in a 
similar tone to the previously mentioned texts. "My fellow citizens. At this hour, American and 
coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and 
to defend the world from grave danger.”230 One can almost hear the echoes of “take up the White 
Man’s burden” with Bush’s declaration that the Western superpower would “free its [Iraq’s] 
people.” The Western savior had once again come to defend the Oriental “old child” that lacked 
the capacity to care for itself. This same pattern that had been seen in the early twentieth century 
was experienced by the Iraqis once again after the invasion in Iraq in 2003, when the occupying 
                                                          
228 Ibid., 74-77.  
229 White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East, 47-49. 
230 George W. Bush, “Address on the start of the war,” (speech, Washington, DC, March 20, 2003), The 
Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush. 
100 
 
force built a new governing council that gave a proportional share of seats based on the ratio of 
communal identities.
231
 
A distinction in the Iraqi 2003 case, however, should be noted. The legitimacy brought 
forth by the League of Nations in the 1920s was no longer the same. The United Nations, which 
essentially replaced the role of the League of Nations, didn’t approve of the American invasion 
of Iraq, though no party took measures to actually stop the intervention. However, the UN did 
put out a resolution that legitimized the US invasion. The UN Security Resolution 1483 states 
that “The Security council… welcoming [sic] the commitment of all parties concerned to support 
the creation of an environment in which they [the Iraqi people] may do so [determine their own 
political future] as soon as possible.” It also goes on with the resolve “that the United Nations 
should play a vital role in… the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of 
national and local institutions for representative governance.”232 The language makes it clear that 
power must be restored to the Iraqi people, however, one cannot help but see the similarity 
between this and the goal of the mandates, which were to allow for the eventual sovereignty of 
the people within the mandated territories. The Orientalist culture of the international system still 
seems present, though it has perhaps evolved into a more cautious discourse. 
Thus, in order to understand the sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Syria, one cannot 
underestimate the power of Orientalism and its resulting material manifestations. The early 
concepts of the Iraqi and Syrian states were formed by the West, which was given power by the 
League of Nations to form new states after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The concept of the 
backward Orient pushed forth policies that halted any progress made during the Ottoman period. 
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In Syria, the French reversed the progress made in the millet system that allowed for greater 
equality between religious groups by more strictly adhering to the separate rule of various 
religious communities, despite popular opinion. In Iraq, the British marginalized the educated 
class brought up under the Ottomans, believing them to be corrupted by the former empire. Even 
in modern Iraq, similar notions of the Western civilizer and savior have allowed for the 
reconstruction of the Iraqi state along religious and ethnic divisions that aggravated sectarian 
tensions. Powerful Orientalist ideas and discourse allowed for these real material outcomes to 
burgeon in Iraq and Syria, and ultimately created the foundations of sectarianism with the very 
foundations of the new states. 
The centrality of Orientalism and its ability to shape states through its powerful ideas and 
concepts is thus an important consideration for the future identities of these – and other regional 
– states. Given the prominent role of the United States and other Western powers in the 
formation of a new order in Iraq – and potentially eventually in Syria whenever the currents 
steady – it is important to recognize the role Orientalism will play. Will Orientalism continue to 
shape interests and perceptions of the international community around false or romantic notions, 
leading to material policies that will continue to perpetuate sectarianism? Or will the system 
recognize the complex nature of the peoples of the region and allow for a more natural order to 
take place? Only time will tell but the restraint of the United Nations in condoning new 
interventions outright, as in the case with Iraq in 2003 and later in the case of Syria since its civil 
war – indicates that perhaps Orientalist notions have dimmed.  
The Iranian Revolution & Regional Identity  
The Iranian Revolution and its impact on the region is another important systemic factor 
that reinforced sectarian construction. Important moments which perpetuated sectarianism in 
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both the cases of Syria and Iraq can be situated in the midst of a conflict over the regional 
identity of Middle Eastern countries. The tensions that arose as a result of the Iranian Revolution 
were systemically at play in perpetuating sectarianism, especially in the period immediately 
following the Revolution. New fears arose over potential upheavals that would destabilize the 
status quo, given Iran’s stance against regional powers. Revolutionary Iranian discourse depicted 
the Sunni governments as tyrannical and illegitimate and thus brought forth a new conflict over 
regional identity.
233
    
Iraq reacted defensively at the outset of the Iranian Revolution. After the Iranian 
Revolution, Iraq executed Shia leader Baqer al-Sadr and deported Iraqis who were accused of 
harboring sentiments for Iran; the regime accused deportees of being “Iranian Iraqis.”234 This 
very explicit reaction shows the degree to which revolutionary momentum of the Iranian 
Revolution was felt in Iraq, which took defensive steps to quell any potential dissident 
movements inspired by the revolutionary fervor. Furthermore, Iraq took real steps to contain the 
threat posed by Iran by invading the country in 1980 and also by supporting exiled Iranians from 
the opposition. The 1991 revolt in Iraq and subsequent extreme reaction of the regime in 
repressing the movement can thus be seen through this prism, as part of a larger threat posed by 
neighboring Iran.  
Like the Saddam regime, the Hafiz regime battled its own internal dissent groups at 
home, which can also be understood as part of this greater systemic rebellious movement that 
gained momentum through the Iranian Revolution. Within this environment of general rebellion, 
the attempted assassination on Hafiz took place, followed by the unprecedented crackdown on 
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Hama in 1982 due to regional fears of instability. Unlike Saddam, Assad was supportive of the 
new Iranian regime and thus had to also face regional backlash for this support. While the Hafiz 
regime was at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, the Jordanians and Egyptians 
added to the sectarian fire by fueling the concept of the “dirty Alawis.”235 In a speech by former 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat: 
Let these dirty Alawis speak for it. These are people who have lost all life’s meaning. By 
God, let them face their people in Syria, because the Syrian people are powerless in this  - 
the attitude of the Alawi is known… [King] Faysal [of Saudi Arabia] told me that Hafiz 
al-Assad is Alawi and Baathist, and the one is more evil than the other… Faysal also told 
me: How can you hold hands with the Syrian Baathists? Al-Assad is an Alawi and 
Baathist; one is more evil than the other. 
In the context of the greater conflict between the Shia threat posed by Iran, which was 
supported by Syria, this behavior can be understood. The harsh language used by the Egyptian 
President is part of the greater regional battle for the identity of the region as Sunni Arab. The 
Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, stood by the Egyptians and 
Jordanians in their aim to contain general rebellions as well as protect the Sunni identity of the 
region.
236
 Looking at the two camps, one notes the obvious religious divide. The ruling parties in 
the Gulf, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan are all Sunni while Syria had no issue siding with the Shia Iran 
due to its own ruling-party identity. Thus, one can also view the increased sectarian tensions in 
Iraq and Syria through the two states’ position within a regional conflict over the identity of the 
Middle East. 
The role of the regional system as a whole is thus an important consideration in 
understanding the potential for sectarian tensions to ignite. Regional movements allow groups 
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with historical grievances – such as sectarian religious groups – to place themselves within a 
larger frame. This was later seen during the Arab Spring, which saw the uprisings of Syria after 
similar protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia and across the Middle East. The ways in which 
regional powers dealt with and continue to deal with protests that continue to echo from the 
memory of the Arab Spring will play an important role in whether or not sectarian religious 
tensions will be further intensified.     
 
Agent & Agent-Interaction Elements of Sectarian Construction 
 The above laid the foundation for understanding the systemic patterns that supported the 
construction of sectarianism in Iraq and Syria, but to continue with the intermestic approach, 
attention also needs to be given to agent and agent-interaction elements, which are equally 
important in this analysis. The agents are the actors that react to the systemic environment, 
without which one cannot have a nuanced understanding of sectarianism. We now assess the 
agent elements which supported in the construction of sectarianism in Syria and Iraq. Three 
patterns are noted here: the insecurity of minority rule, the extreme sectarian reactions by 
regimes and the burgeoning religious discourse and maneuvers by the regimes.   
Insecurity of Minority Rule  
 One of the main agent-patterns of the two cases is the religious-minority status of the 
ruling regime. The Baathist regimes in both countries espoused a secular ideology that could 
have absorbed political movements from all kinds of backgrounds, including Islamists, 
moderates and others. However, there was a prevalent insecurity of both regimes due to their 
ruling party’s overwhelmingly religious-minority leaders. This led to the interpretation of protest 
movements as overtly sectarian, against minority rule. Were these sentiments founded on reality?   
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Both regimes were dominated by the leaders’ religious kin. As has been noted earlier in 
Chapter 2, Saddam favored his own family members and the Tikriti tribe over others – most of 
whom were Sunni, despite the fact that the majority of the country was Shia.
237
 Both Hafiz al-
Assad and Bashar al-Assad’s regimes placed Alawi’s within the main political power 
structures.
238
 Previous analysis has shown attempts by both parties to co-opt the majority 
population which felt disenfranchised to varying degrees. However, the very nature of the rule of 
the minority at the expense of the majority is something that clearly had an effect on the 
constitution of sectarian identities. The regimes’ apparent insecurity – as will be shown shortly 
by an analysis of their reactions to rebellions – supported in framing any rebellion as part of an 
“us” versus “them.” This dichotomy was defined by religious identities. This idea of the fear of a 
possible uprising by the majority religious sectarian group affected the interests of the regimes in 
suppressing any political opposition and whole religious groups as opposed to dissents only.  
Extreme Sectarian Reactions by Regimes 
When rebellions arose in both cases, the dictatorial rulers revealed their insecurities and 
simultaneously constituted the state’s sectarianism identity. The suppression after major 
rebellions in both Iraq and Syria were not only brutal but also produced clear sectarian reactions. 
This allowed for the burgeoning of sectarian sentiments in Iraq and Syria.  
In Iraq after the failed invasion of Kuwait, protesters took to the streets in all nine of the 
Shia-dominant governorates.
239
 The apparent sectarian nature of the rebellion dissuaded Sunnis 
from joining. Instead of only reacting to the protesters, the regime took on a new sectarian slogan 
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- “There will be no Shia after today.”240 The regime took unprecedented steps to put Shia clerics 
under house arrest and destroy Shia religious shrines.  
The Iraqi regime had the choice to view the 1991 rebellion as an isolated event. Instead, it 
perceived the threat along sectarian lines and took measures accordingly. Because of the looming 
system threat posed by the Iranian Revolution and the regime’s own insecurity over its identity 
as part of the minority religious group, the rebellion became an important point of contention that 
would further mar Iraqi relations internally. The regime thus fueled sectarian discourse that 
further exacerbated sectarian divisions by perceiving the rebellion through this prism, instead of 
viewing the threat as only a political one or one limited to certain individuals as opposed to an 
entire religious sect. At the same time, the Sunnis who didn’t join the protests also allowed for 
this kind of discourse by delegitimizing the rebellion as a result of its supposedly Shia nature. 
The people and the regime thus constituted the conflict along sectarian lines. 
Similarly, in Syria after an attempted assassination of Hafiz al-Assad, the regime 
executed a massacre of unprecedented levels in the country.
241
  The units led by President 
Assad’s brother Rif’at killed an entire prison full of Muslim Brotherhood members as they sat in 
their cells. The height of the showdown occurred in the city of Hama when ten percent of its 
predominantly Sunnis population was decimated by an Alawi Baath unit, killing anywhere from 
an estimated 5000 to 25000 victims.
242
 Hafiz’s actions were perhaps less overtly sectarian as he 
did not justify the massacre along religious lines, but the reaction was just as extreme. Attacking 
the Muslim Brotherhood just prior to the massacre, Assad had stated “May God curse them and 
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their Islam. We shall not have one Islam with them. They are murderers of Islam and 
Muslims.”243 While not pointing to the type of Islam and perhaps attempting to simply push the 
Brotherhood out of the Islamic tradition, Assad is still using religious terms and bringing 
salience to religious identities. The extreme reaction in the Hama Massacre, situated in the 
general sentiment of Alawi domination and the use of religious discourse, easily allowed for a 
sectarian interpretation of the catastrophic event.   
These extreme reactions against the opposition reveal several things about the regimes. 
First, as has been noted, the regimes were highly insecure. As they couldn’t be certain of who 
was in the opposition and who was supportive, they chose to target an entire population based on 
what appeared to be religious faith. Why would this be the reaction? The regimes’ own sense of 
identity as part of a religious minority appears to have played an important role. Targeting an 
entire religious population shows the “us” versus “them” mentality within the regimes as a result 
of internal fears about the regimes’ minority identity within the country. Their reactions re-
constituted the sectarian identities within the states by pitting two groups opposite each other. 
Burgeoning Religious Discourse and Maneuvers 
Prior to the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, religious discourse and religious institutions 
burgeoned, while other forms of civil and political organizations suffered. This is integral to our 
understanding of the growth of sectarianism as parallel to the general decline of most forms of 
political organization was a greater presence of religious discourse within states, which allowed 
for an increased sense of religious identity. In the years preceding civil unrest, both regimes had 
played a dangerous game by evoking religion and allowing extremism to grow unabated.  
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In Iraq’s case, the UN sanctions in the 1990s and Saddam’s war against Iran pushed forth 
a new sectarian discourse in the country, as has been assessed. The regime allowed tribes to 
flourish, in place of its own incompetence in supporting the people due to sanctions.
244
 Its 
support for Sunni tribes allowed for sectarian sentiments to burgeon. Due to the religious tones 
of the Iranians which threatened Saddam’s rule, the regime framed the conflict around similar 
religious notions. On the one hand, Khomeini fueled sectarianism with declarations such as, 
“You are fighting to protect Islam, and [Saddam] is fighting to destroy Islam.”245 Saddam 
similarly positioned himself in religious terms as a mujahid. State-supported religious discourse 
grew to new heights, allowing for sectarian religious identities to burgeon and grow. The explicit 
“Faith Campaign,” with its Sunni-basis, supported the growth of religious sentiments by 
encouraging stricter adherence to Islamic principles. The person to mosque ratio rose 
substantially from 1:37,000 in the 1950s to 1:3,500 in the 1990s. And the media attacked Shia 
religious rituals and traditions. As has been previously noted, Jerry Long’s analysis shows a 
significant escalation of the Iraqi state’s religious discourse from the sixties to the nineties. 246 
Such maneuvers may have seemed tactically sound at the time, by attempting to counteract the 
catastrophic results of UN sanctions and retaliating to the Iranian religious discourse, but the 
long-term consequences proved disastrous as radically conservative forms of religious discourse 
grew and a greater sense of sectarian identity proliferated.  
In the twenty-first century the Assad regime in Syria had a similar experience. As has 
been analyzed, Assad pushed secularists to the fringes of society while he toyed with 
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conservative religious movements. The Bashar regime extended an olive branch to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, to reconcile what had happened in the Hama Massacre of eighty-two.
247
 Secularists 
that criticized radically conservative Islamic movements, like Nabil Fayyad, were put to jail. 
While the regime made it impossible for civil society to grow by banning meetings of five or 
more people, Islamists found a safe haven in Quranic schools and mosques. As political scientist 
Salam Kawkibi stated, “Nowadays there are hundreds of mosques in Damascus but not a single 
meeting hall for secular people. This says everything.”248 And according to philosopher Tayyeb 
Tizini, “The regime has sometimes actively supported the Islamists because they wanted to keep 
them as a visible danger to the secular opposition: ‘Just look, this is the danger. Either you have 
us or you get them.’” The regime’s encouragement of the resistance in Iraq, as part of its 
strategic opposition to the U.S., allowed for religious fanatics to funnel through Syria in order to 
fight in Iraq. In the end, the regime got more than it had bargained for by pursuing policies that 
suppressed all but religiously-motivated organizations.  
Thus, prior to their respective civil wars, both states escalated religious tensions through 
greater religiously provocative discourse and actions. Such maneuvers allowed for the 
construction of conflicts around religious lines, which brought greater salience to religious 
identities. Both regimes had attempted to use religion in their favor. Saddam tried to combat 
Iran’s religiously fueled attacks with his own. Bashar attempted to dissuade rebels and 
oppositionists by allowing a more conservative threat to rise. In the end, the tactical maneuvers 
by the regimes did nothing to protect the status-quo and allowed for an eventual explosion of 
sectarian tensions supported by religious fervor.  
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Conclusion 
Thus, we can see that the construction of sectarianism is a complex process that requires 
both a nurturing systemic environment as well as agent support in building such tensions. One 
cannot sum up the conflicts in Syria and Iraq as a result of ancient primordial hatreds or, as U.S. 
President Barack Obama once stated in 2013, that “in that part of the world, there are ancient 
sectarian differences.”249 That is an overly simplistic and reductionist comment that takes away 
from a nuanced understanding of the historic and modern ideas, interests and material structures 
that have cultivated sectarianism through the system and agents. Furthermore, this thesis aimed 
to highlight the importance of including analyses of the complexities of intermestics in 
international relations in order to form a nuanced understanding of international issues and 
topics, including sectarianism. 
This thesis aimed to give a comprehensive analysis of the construction of sectarianism in 
two of the world’s most intriguing civil conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Through this research, we 
have assessed case-by-case analyses of the construction of sectarianism in Iraq and Syria from 
the early twentieth century when the Syrian and Iraqi states were first formed under Western 
mandates up until the modern period in the twenty-first century at the outbreak of war. This 
thesis has brought to light the common structural and agent-level elements that allowed for the 
burgeoning of sectarian identities within the states. I have highlighted the centrality of Orientalist 
ideas in conceiving the earliest visions of the Syrian and Iraqi states, which have had an 
irreversible impact on both cases, allowing for a historical sense of victimhood among certain 
religiously-defined sectarian groups in both countries. This thesis has also analyzed the impact of 
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the Iranian Revolution in creating a regional identity conflict which reinforced sectarian 
discourse and produced sectarian reactions. Three agent-level patterns have been highlighted to 
better understand the growth of sectarianism, including the insecurity of minority rule, extreme 
sectarian reactions by regimes under attack by certain opposition groups and the general growth 
of religious discourse and actions in the two countries as well as the region prior to the outbreak 
of the civil wars.  
This thesis has brought forth a nuanced analysis of modern events. Short-term analyses 
that only look at modern occurrences become overly simplistic and ignore the important impact 
of historic sentiments of victimhood and conflicts that fuel sectarianism. Thus, this thesis has 
brought forth a historic analysis of a period of approximately a century. Looking through the 
Constructivist lens has allowed for a more complete understanding of sectarianism by focusing 
on not only material outcomes but also on ideas and interests. I have aimed to assess the 
construction of sectarianism through an equal focus on structural and agent elements, 
operationalized by an intermestic approach. 
This thesis provides not only an analysis of these two cases but also brings forth new 
questions. If the Iranian Revolution had such long-term consequences on sectarianism, what 
impact will the Arab Spring have on the region? The first victim of the Arab Spring, Syria, has 
fallen. Libya is in a similarly precarious position. What of the remaining neighboring countries? 
The Gulf countries have similarly large diversity among their religious sects and strong divisions 
between Shias and Sunnis. Their reactions to protest movements have been as brutal as those of 
Hafiz al-Assad in the 1982 Hama Massacre and Saddam in the 1990s.
250
 Will regional powers 
learn the dangers of such explicit sectarian reactions to demonstrations? In the case of Bahrain, a 
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minority rules, as in the cases of Iraq and Syria, with a Shia majority population ruled by a Sunni 
head.
251
 How will intermestics play out in other regional players? The two case studies from this 
thesis exemplify the importance of including an analysis of intermestics in future research.  
One can note almost all of the patterns pointed to in this chapter as still characteristic of 
many of the Middle East’s regional powers. Orientalist discourse remains on the larger systemic 
scale, as the UN and other international groups continue to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs. 
The threat posed by the Iranian Revolution remains a prominent issue among Middle Eastern 
countries with large Shia populations, like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Minority rule plagues 
countries like Bahrain and the “other-ing” of certain religious groups threatens even states with 
majority rule. Burgeoning religious discourse is at an all-time high with the threat of Daesh. 
Furthermore, Middle Eastern states continue to react to demonstrations with extreme state 
repression that may bolster a sense of sectarian victimhood across the region and allow for the 
fueling of sectarian conflict.  
Understanding how sectarianism is constructed is essential to learning from the mistakes 
of the past. This thesis aimed to put forth a Constructivist analysis of sectarianism in Syria and 
Iraq, followed by a synthetic analysis of important patterns that contributed to the eruption of 
sectarian violence in both cases. Structurally, Orientalism in the international system and the 
identity threat of the Iranian Revolution allowed for the burgeoning of sectarian discourse and 
reactions. On the agent-level, the minority rule of both states and the extreme sectarian reactions 
of states against dissidents supported the construction of a sectarian sense of victimhood. 
Furthermore, a general increase in religious discourse in Iraq and Syria, as well as in the region, 
brought greater salience to religious sectarian identities which would later erupt into sectarian 
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civil war. One not only wonders about the future of these states, but also about neighboring 
countries and their potential to follow in these dangerous footsteps. Will states learn from the 
mistakes of the past and take heed of the dangers of fueling sectarian fire, or, given just the 
wrong circumstances, will we witness more sectarian violence in the region?     
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